Xpra has experimental Linux-only Landlock policies for the whole client or server process. Confinement is disabled by default.
xpra attach :100 --landlock=default
xpra start :100 --landlock=strict
| --landlock= | Filesystem policy | |---|---| |
no | Do not install an Xpra Landlock policy. | |
default | Broad system and user reads; writes limited to
application directories. | | strict | Reads limited to
required resources; writes limited to dedicated application directories.
|
The option also works as landlock = MODE in
configuration. Command line settings override configuration. Values are
case insensitive. no, false, 0
and off select no; yes,
true, 1 and on select
default. The mode is not exported to the environment: the
commands started by the server inherit the Landlock policy itself, but
xpra commands run from the session do not try to install their own.
Server upgrades use the current Landlock option rather than reloading
the previous server's saved mode. Selecting no cannot
remove restrictions inherited from a parent process.
Both enabled modes require Landlock ABI 9 or newer and fail startup on Linux if confinement cannot be installed. The option has no effect on other platforms. Thread synchronization, introduced in ABI 8, confines existing initialization threads as well as future threads. ABI 9 adds pathname Unix-socket resolution restrictions. Xpra requires both facilities.
The client LandLock subsystem parses its options in
init(). The listener subsystem creates its sockets in
load(), before confinement. LandLock installs the policy in
run(), before the main loop starts connection work,
including remote starts and listen mode. Its
setup_connection() hook also ensures that confinement is
installed before Xpra protocol processing. Failed enforcement raises
InitExit and aborts startup; repeated hooks do not install
additional policy layers. Both LandLock subsystems report the mode,
enforcement state, ABI and private temporary directory through
get_info().
Qt, Pyglet and Tk clients do not support Landlock and require
--landlock=no. They connect synchronously and do not use
the client subsystem lifecycle.
The server LandLock subsystem installs its policy in
setup(), before the remaining subsystems and listeners
start. All the server subsystems' early_setup() methods are
called before that, which is where the session D-Bus, the PulseAudio
server and the input method daemon (ibus-daemon) are
started, so these are not confined. Subsystems declare the paths they
need once confined with get_landlock_paths(), ie: the menu
subsystem's icon cache directory. Both client and server subsystems
remove their owned private temporary directories during lifecycle
cleanup, including failed enforcement. Each subsystem stores its
temporary path and owner PID; cleanup only removes storage owned by the
current process.
default allows reads from standard system roots, the
active Python installation, the current directory, HOME,
and the XDG configuration, data, cache, state and runtime directories.
It does not protect unrelated home files from being
read. Clients can write to their configured download directory and
temporary directories. Servers can write to their session and temporary
directories, and to the menu-icon cache directory when the start menu is
enabled.
strict removes blanket access to HOME, the
current directory, arbitrary Python search paths and entire user XDG
directories. It allows system code and resources, the actual Python
runtime and Xpra package, Xpra configuration, fonts/themes, desktop
configuration, and individual authentication files. Explicitly
configured certificate, key and password files must exist before
startup. For SSH, default identity files, known-hosts files and
host-configured identities are readable; the rest of the SSH directory
remains outside the policy.
Strict writes are limited to the client's download directory or the
server's session and menu-icon cache directories (the latter only when
the start menu is enabled), plus explicitly configured mmap resources.
Grants for /, the whole home directory, /tmp,
/var/tmp or /dev/shm are rejected. Configure a
dedicated download directory before using strict if your normal download
directory falls back to /tmp, for example in
xpra.conf:
download-path = ~/Downloads
landlock = strictRequired writable directories are prepared before enforcement.
Private temporary storage is created with mode 0700 inside
the download/session directory, and temporary files and automatically
allocated mmap files use it. It is reused on exec and removed during
normal client/server cleanup; helpers do not remove their parent's
temporary files. An abrupt termination may leave it behind. Reconnect
after cleanup creates fresh private temporary storage.
Client listener sockets, including listen-mode sockets, are created
before confinement. Separate directory rules permit socket lookup and
cleanup without granting general file writes. In strict mode, new
pathname sockets are denied afterward. Server display, network and
session sockets and session D-Bus are also created before enforcement.
Strict grants socket lookup for Xpra connections, the display,
session/system D-Bus, PulseAudio and SSH agents using their known paths,
rather than broad runtime roots. The PulseAudio server started by Xpra
is granted socket lookup in its whole directory, because its socket does
not exist yet when the policy is installed. Likewise for the
ibus socket directory, and the directory containing its
address files is readable.
Both modes allow graphics devices below /dev/dri and
/dev/accel, and standard devices such as
/dev/null, /dev/urandom and pseudo-terminals.
Device entries cannot be created, removed or renamed. Strict permits the
process's own procfs directory and public kernel and graphics-driver
version files. Unless explicitly configured otherwise, strict uses the
in-memory GSettings backend so desktop settings do not require shared
dconf writes. Directory rules also permit removing the emptied server
session directory.
For local mmap connections involving strict confinement, configure
the same dedicated shared directory explicitly on both peers, for
example --mmap=/run/user/1000/xpra/mmap. Create it before
startup so it is recognized as a directory. Automatic private mmap
storage is not accessible to another confined process; without a shared
location, negotiation can fall back to network encoding.
Restrictions are inherited across fork and
exec. Applications and helpers started after confinement
receive the same policy, including late server commands, audio and
printing helpers, and commands used to open files or URLs. Strict mode
can limit uploads, credential updates, desktop helpers and applications
which need other paths. There is no file-access broker or runtime
permission prompt. File descriptors opened before confinement retain
their existing access.
Landlock denies disallowed operations; strict does not
kill the process like --seccomp=strict. Filesystem rules
govern pathname Unix sockets, not the general socket()
syscall, TCP/UDP ports or abstract Unix sockets. Network-port and
IPC-scope restrictions are not enabled. Landlock can be combined with
seccomp.
Add -d landlock to log the selected mode, ABI and
filesystem grants. Denials normally produce EACCES; audit
details may be available in the system audit log or kernel journal. A
trace can identify the denied operation and path:
strace -f -e trace=%file,network -o /tmp/xpra-landlock.strace xpra attach :100 --landlock=strict
rg 'EACCES|EPERM' /tmp/xpra-landlock.strace