This is heimdal.info, produced by makeinfo version 4.7 from
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INFO-DIR-SECTION Security
START-INFO-DIR-ENTRY
* Heimdal: (heimdal).           The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH
END-INFO-DIR-ENTRY


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Top,  Next: Introduction,  Prev: (dir),  Up: (dir)

Heimdal
*******

This manual is last updated $Date: 2006/10/20 20:03:34 $ for version
0.8 of Heimdal.

* Menu:

* Introduction::
* What is Kerberos?::
* Building and Installing::
* Setting up a realm::
* Applications::
* Things in search for a better place::
* Kerberos 4 issues::
* Windows 2000 compatability::
* Programming with Kerberos::
* Migration::
* Acknowledgments::

 --- The Detailed Node Listing ---

Setting up a realm

* Configuration file::
* Creating the database::
* Modifying the database::
* keytabs::
* Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver::
* Remote administration::
* Password changing::
* Testing clients and servers::
* Slave Servers::
* Incremental propagation::
* Salting::
* Cross realm::
* Transit policy::
* Setting up DNS::
* Using LDAP to store the database::
* Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs::
* Setting up PK-INIT::

Applications

* Authentication modules::
* AFS::

Authentication modules

* Digital SIA::
* IRIX::

Kerberos 4 issues

* Principal conversion issues::
* Converting a version 4 database::
* kaserver::

Windows 2000 compatability

* Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC::
* Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC::
* Create account mappings::
* Encryption types::
* Authorisation data::
* Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC::
* Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000::

Programming with Kerberos

* Kerberos 5 API Overview::
* Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client::
* Validating a password in a server application::
* API differences to MIT Kerberos::
* File formats::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Introduction,  Next: What is Kerberos?,  Prev: Top,  Up: Top

1 Introduction
**************

What is Heimdal?
================

Heimdal is a free implementation of Kerberos 5. The goals are to:

   * have an implementation that can be freely used by anyone

   * be protocol compatible with existing implementations and, if not in
     conflict, with RFC 4120 (and any future updated RFC). RFC 4120
     replaced RFC 1510.

   * be reasonably compatible with the M.I.T Kerberos V5 API

   * have support for Kerberos V5 over GSS-API (RFC1964)

   * include the most important and useful application programs (rsh,
     telnet, popper, etc.)

   * include enough backwards compatibility with Kerberos V4

Status
======

Heimdal has the following features (this does not mean any of this
works):

   * a stub generator and a library to encode/decode/whatever ASN.1/DER
     stuff

   * a `libkrb5' library that should be possible to get to work with
     simple applications

   * a GSS-API library

   * `kinit', `klist', `kdestroy'

   * `telnet', `telnetd'

   * `rsh', `rshd'

   * `popper', `push' (a movemail equivalent)

   * `ftp', and `ftpd'

   * a library `libkafs' for authenticating to AFS and a program
     `afslog' that uses it

   * some simple test programs

   * a KDC that supports most things; optionally, it may also support
     Kerberos V4 and kaserver,

   * simple programs for distributing databases between a KDC master and
     slaves

   * a password changing daemon `kpasswdd', library functions for
     changing passwords and a simple client

   * some kind of administration system

   * Kerberos V4 support in many of the applications.

Bug reports
===========

If you find bugs in this software, make sure it is a genuine bug and not
just a part of the code that isn't implemented.

Bug reports should be sent to <heimdal-bugs@pdc.kth.se>. Please include
information on what machine and operating system (including version)
you are running, what you are trying to do, what happens, what you
think should have happened, an example for us to repeat, the output you
get when trying the example, and a patch for the problem if you have
one. Please make any patches with `diff -u' or `diff -c'.

Suggestions, comments and other non bug reports are also welcome.

Mailing list
============

There are two mailing lists with talk about Heimdal.
<heimdal-announce@sics.se> is a low-volume announcement list, while
<heimdal-discuss@sics.se> is for general discussion.  Send a message to
<majordomo@sics.se> to subscribe.

Heimdal source code, binaries and the manual
============================================

The source code for heimdal, links to binaries and the manual (this
document) can be found on our web-page at
`http://www.pdc.kth.se/heimdal/'.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: What is Kerberos?,  Next: Building and Installing,  Prev: Introduction,  Up: Top

2 What is Kerberos?
*******************

     Now this Cerberus had three heads of dogs,
             the tail of a dragon, and on his back the
             heads of all sorts of snakes.
             -- Pseudo-Apollodorus Library 2.5.12

Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services on a network.
It is built upon the assumption that the network is "unsafe".  For
example, data sent over the network can be eavesdropped and altered, and
addresses can also be faked.  Therefore they cannot be used for
authentication purposes.  

Kerberos is a trusted third-party service.  That means that there is a
third party (the kerberos server) that is trusted by all the entities on
the network (users and services, usually called "principals").  All
principals share a secret password (or key) with the kerberos server and
this enables principals to verify that the messages from the kerberos
server are authentic.  Thus trusting the kerberos server, users and
services can authenticate each other.

2.1 Basic mechanism
===================

     *Note* This discussion is about Kerberos version 4, but version 5
     works similarly.

In Kerberos, principals use "tickets" to prove that they are who they
claim to be. In the following example, A is the initiator of the
authentication exchange, usually a user, and B is the service that A
wishes to use.

To obtain a ticket for a specific service, A sends a ticket request to
the kerberos server. The request contains A's and B's names (along with
some other fields). The kerberos server checks that both A and B are
valid principals.

Having verified the validity of the principals, it creates a packet
containing A's and B's names, A's network address (A<ADDR>), the
current time (T<ISSUE>), the lifetime of the ticket (LIFE), and a
secret "session key" (K<AB>). This packet is encrypted with B's secret
key (K<B>).  The actual ticket (T<AB>) looks like this: ({A, B,
A<ADDR>, T<ISSUE>, LIFE, K<AB>}K<B>).

The reply to A consists of the ticket (T<AB>), B's name, the current
time, the lifetime of the ticket, and the session key, all encrypted in
A's secret key ({B, T<ISSUE>, LIFE, K<AB>, T<AB>}K<A>). A decrypts the
reply and retains it for later use.


Before sending a message to B, A creates an authenticator consisting of
A's name, A's address, the current time, and a "checksum" chosen by A,
all encrypted with the secret session key ({A, A<ADDR>, T<CURRENT>,
CHECKSUM}K<AB>). This is sent together with the ticket received from
the kerberos server to B.  Upon reception, B decrypts the ticket using
B's secret key.  Since the ticket contains the session key that the
authenticator was encrypted with, B can now also decrypt the
authenticator. To verify that A really is A, B now has to compare the
contents of the ticket with that of the authenticator. If everything
matches, B now considers A as properly authenticated.

2.2 Different attacks
=====================

Impersonating A
---------------

An impostor, C could steal the authenticator and the ticket as it is
transmitted across the network, and use them to impersonate A. The
address in the ticket and the authenticator was added to make it more
difficult to perform this attack.  To succeed C will have to either use
the same machine as A or fake the source addresses of the packets. By
including the time stamp in the authenticator, C does not have much
time in which to mount the attack.

Impersonating B
---------------

C can hijack B's network address, and when A sends her credentials, C
just pretend to verify them. C can't be sure that she is talking to A.

2.3 Defence strategies
======================

It would be possible to add a "replay cache" to the server side.  The
idea is to save the authenticators sent during the last few minutes, so
that B can detect when someone is trying to retransmit an already used
message. This is somewhat impractical (mostly regarding efficiency),
and is not part of Kerberos 4; MIT Kerberos 5 contains it.

To authenticate B, A might request that B sends something back that
proves that B has access to the session key. An example of this is the
checksum that A sent as part of the authenticator. One typical
procedure is to add one to the checksum, encrypt it with the session
key and send it back to A.  This is called "mutual authentication".

The session key can also be used to add cryptographic checksums to the
messages sent between A and B (known as "message integrity").
Encryption can also be added ("message confidentiality"). This is
probably the best approach in all cases.  

2.4 Further reading
===================

The original paper on Kerberos from 1988 is `Kerberos: An
Authentication Service for Open Network Systems', by Jennifer Steiner,
Clifford Neuman and Jeffrey I. Schiller.

A less technical description can be found in `Designing an
Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes' by Bill Bryant, also
from 1988.

These documents can be found on our web-page at
`http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/'.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Building and Installing,  Next: Setting up a realm,  Prev: What is Kerberos?,  Up: Top

3 Building and Installing
*************************

Heimdal uses GNU Autoconf to configure for specific hosts, and GNU
Automake to manage makefiles. If this is new to you, the short
instruction is to run the `configure' script in the top level
directory, and when that finishes `make'.

If you want to build the distribution in a different directory from the
source directory, you will need a make that implements VPATH correctly,
such as GNU make.

You will need to build the distribution:

   * A compiler that supports a "loose" ANSI C mode, such as `gcc'.

   * lex or flex

   * awk

   * yacc or bison

   * a socket library

   * NDBM or Berkeley DB for building the server side.

When everything is built, you can install by doing `make install'. The
default location for installation is `/usr/heimdal', but this can be
changed by running `configure' with `--prefix=/some/other/place'.

If you need to change the default behaviour, configure understands the
following options:

`--without-berkeley-db'
     DB is preferred before NDBM, but if you for some reason want to
     use NDBM instead, you can use this option.

`--with-krb4=`dir''
     Gives the location of Kerberos 4 libraries and headers. This
     enables Kerberos 4 support in the applications (telnet, rsh,
     popper, etc) and the KDC. It is automatically found if present
     under `/usr/athena'.  If you keep libraries and headers in
     different places, you can instead give the path to each with the
     `--with-krb4-lib=`dir'', and `--with-krb4-include=`dir'' options.

     You will need a fairly recent version of our Kerberos 4
     distribution for `rshd' and `popper' to support version 4 clients.

`--enable-dce'
     Enables support for getting DCE credentials and tokens.  See the
     README files in `appl/dceutils' for more information.

`--disable-otp'
     By default some of the application programs will build with
     support for one-time passwords (OTP).  Use this option to disable
     that support.

`--enable-osfc2'
     Enable some C2 support for OSF/Digital Unix/Tru64.  Use this
     option if you are running your OSF operating system in C2 mode.

`--with-readline=`dir''
     Gives the path for the GNU Readline library, which will be used in
     some programs. If no readline library is found, the (simpler)
     editline library will be used instead.

`--with-hesiod=`dir''
     Enables hesiod support in push.

`--enable-netinfo'
     Add support for using netinfo to lookup configuration information.
     Probably only useful (and working) on NextStep/Mac OS X.

`--without-ipv6'
     Disable the IPv6 support.

`--with-openldap'
     Compile Heimdal with support for storing the database in LDAP.
     Requires OpenLDAP `http://www.openldap.org'.  See
     `http://www.padl.com/Research/Heimdal.html' for more information.

`--enable-bigendian'

`--enable-littleendian'
     Normally, the build process will figure out by itself if the
     machine is big or little endian.  It might fail in some cases when
     cross-compiling.  If it does fail to figure it out, use the
     relevant of these two options.

`--with-mips-abi=ABI'
     On Irix there are three different ABIs that can be used (`32',
     `n32', or `64').  This option allows you to override the automatic
     selection.

`--disable-mmap'
     Do not use the mmap system call.  Normally, configure detects if
     there is a working mmap and it is only used if there is one.  Only
     try this option if it fails to work anyhow.



File: heimdal.info,  Node: Setting up a realm,  Next: Applications,  Prev: Building and Installing,  Up: Top

4 Setting up a realm
********************

A realm is an administrative domain.  The name of a Kerberos realm is
usually the Internet domain name in uppercase.  Call your realm the same
as your Internet domain name if you do not have strong reasons for not
doing so.  It will make life easier for you and everyone else.

* Menu:

* Configuration file::
* Creating the database::
* Modifying the database::
* Checking the setup::
* keytabs::
* Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver::
* Remote administration::
* Password changing::
* Testing clients and servers::
* Slave Servers::
* Incremental propagation::
* Salting::
* Cross realm::
* Transit policy::
* Setting up DNS::
* Using LDAP to store the database::
* Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs::
* Setting up PK-INIT::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Configuration file,  Next: Creating the database,  Prev: Setting up a realm,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.1 Configuration file
======================

To setup a realm you will first have to create a configuration file:
`/etc/krb5.conf'. The `krb5.conf' file can contain many configuration
options, some of which are described here.

There is a sample `krb5.conf' supplied with the distribution.

The configuration file is a hierarchical structure consisting of
sections, each containing a list of bindings (either variable
assignments or subsections). A section starts with `[`section-name']'.
A binding consists of a left hand side, an equal sign (`=') and a right
hand side (the left hand side tag must be separated from the equal sign
with some whitespace). Subsections have a `{' as the first
non-whitespace character after the equal sign. All other bindings are
treated as variable assignments. The value of a variable extends to the
end of the line.

     [section1]
             a-subsection = {
                     var = value1
                     other-var = value with {}
                     sub-sub-section = {
                             var = 123
                     }
             }
             var = some other value
     [section2]
             var = yet another value

In this manual, names of sections and bindings will be given as strings
separated by slashes (`/'). The `other-var' variable will thus be
`section1/a-subsection/other-var'.

For in-depth information about the contents of the configuration file,
refer to the `krb5.conf' manual page. Some of the more important
sections are briefly described here.

The `libdefaults' section contains a list of library configuration
parameters, such as the default realm and the timeout for KDC
responses. The `realms' section contains information about specific
realms, such as where they hide their KDC. This section serves the same
purpose as the Kerberos 4 `krb.conf' file, but can contain more
information. Finally the `domain_realm' section contains a list of
mappings from domains to realms, equivalent to the Kerberos 4
`krb.realms' file.

To continue with the realm setup, you will have to create a
configuration file, with contents similar to the following.

     [libdefaults]
             default_realm = MY.REALM
     [realms]
             MY.REALM = {
                     kdc = my.kdc my.slave.kdc
                     kdc = my.third.kdc
             }
     [domain_realm]
             .my.domain = MY.REALM

If you use a realm name equal to your domain name, you can omit the
`libdefaults', and `domain_realm', sections. If you have a DNS
SRV-record for your realm, or your Kerberos server has DNS CNAME
`kerberos.my.realm', you can omit the `realms' section too.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Creating the database,  Next: Modifying the database,  Prev: Configuration file,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.2 Creating the database
=========================

The database library will look for the database in the directory
`/var/heimdal', so you should probably create that directory.  Make
sure the directory has restrictive permissions.

     # mkdir /var/heimdal

The keys of all the principals are stored in the database.  If you
choose to, these can be encrypted with a master key.  You do not have to
remember this key (or password), but just to enter it once and it will
be stored in a file (`/var/heimdal/m-key').  If you want to have a
master key, run `kstash' to create this master key:

     # kstash
     Master key:
     Verifying password - Master key:

If you want to generate a random master key you can use the -random-key
to kstash. This will make sure you have a good key on which attackers
can't do a dictionary attack.

If you have a master key, make sure you make a backup of your master
key file; without it backups of the database are of no use.

To initialise the database use the `kadmin' program, with the `-l'
option (to enable local database mode). First issue a `init MY.REALM'
command. This will create the database and insert default principals
for that realm. You can have more than one realm in one database, so
`init' does not destroy any old database.

Before creating the database, `init' will ask you some questions about
maximum ticket lifetimes.

After creating the database you should probably add yourself to it. You
do this with the `add' command. It takes as argument the name of a
principal. The principal should contain a realm, so if you haven't set
up a default realm, you will need to explicitly include the realm.

     # kadmin -l
     kadmin> init MY.REALM
     Realm max ticket life [unlimited]:
     Realm max renewable ticket life [unlimited]:
     kadmin> add me
     Max ticket life [unlimited]:
     Max renewable life [unlimited]:
     Attributes []:
     Password:
     Verifying password - Password:

Now start the KDC and try getting a ticket.

     # kdc &
     # kinit me
     me@MY.REALMS's Password:
     # klist
     Credentials cache: /tmp/krb5cc_0
             Principal: me@MY.REALM

       Issued           Expires          Principal
     Aug 25 07:25:55  Aug 25 17:25:55  krbtgt/MY.REALM@MY.REALM

If you are curious you can use the `dump' command to list all the
entries in the database.  It should look something similar to the
following example (note that the entries here are truncated for
typographical reasons):

     kadmin> dump
     me@MY.REALM 1:0:1:0b01d3cb7c293b57:-:0:7:8aec316b9d1629e3baf8 ...
     kadmin/admin@MY.REALM 1:0:1:e5c8a2675b37a443:-:0:7:cb913ebf85 ...
     krbtgt/MY.REALM@MY.REALM 1:0:1:52b53b61c875ce16:-:0:7:c8943be ...
     kadmin/changepw@MY.REALM 1:0:1:f48c8af2b340e9fb:-:0:7:e3e6088 ...


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Modifying the database,  Next: Checking the setup,  Prev: Creating the database,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.3 Modifying the database
==========================

All modifications of principals are done with with kadmin.

A principal has several attributes and lifetimes associated with it.

Principals are added, renamed, modified, and deleted with the kadmin
commands `add', `rename', `modify', `delete'.  Both interactive editing
and command line flags can be used (use -help to list the available
options).

There are different kinds of types for the fields in the database;
attributes, absolute time times and relative times.

4.3.1 Attributes
----------------

When doing interactive editing, attributes are listed with `?'.

The attributes are given in a comma (`,') separated list.  Attributes
are removed from the list by prefixing them with `-'.

     kadmin> modify me
     Max ticket life [1 day]:
     Max renewable life [1 week]:
     Principal expiration time [never]:
     Password expiration time [never]:
     Attributes [disallow-renewable]: requires-pre-auth,-disallow-renewable
     kadmin> get me
                 Principal: me@MY.REALM
     [...]
                Attributes: requires-pre-auth

4.3.2 Absolute times
--------------------

The format for absolute times are any of the following:

     never
     now
     YYYY-mm-dd
     YYYY-mm-dd HH:MM:SS

4.3.3 Relative times
--------------------

The format for relative times are any of the following combined:

     N year
     M month
     O day
     P hour
     Q minute
     R second


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Checking the setup,  Next: keytabs,  Prev: Modifying the database,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.4 Checking the setup
======================

There are two tools that can check the consistency of the Kerberos
configuration file and the Kerberos database.

The Kerberos configuration file is checked using `verify_krb5_conf'.
The tool checks for common errors, but commonly there are several
uncommon configuration entries that are never added to the tool and
thus generates "unknown entry" warnings.  This is usually nothing to
worry about.

The database check is built into the kadmin tool. It will check for
common configuration error that will cause problems later. Common check
are for existence and flags on important principals. The database check
by run by the following command :

     kadmin check REALM.EXAMPLE.ORG


File: heimdal.info,  Node: keytabs,  Next: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver,  Prev: Checking the setup,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.5 keytabs
===========

To extract a service ticket from the database and put it in a keytab,
you need to first create the principal in the database with `ank'
(using the `--random-key' flag to get a random key) and then extract it
with `ext_keytab'.

     kadmin> add --random-key host/my.host.name
     Max ticket life [unlimited]:
     Max renewable life [unlimited]:
     Attributes []:
     kadmin> ext host/my.host.name
     kadmin> exit
     # ktutil list
     Version  Type             Principal
          1   des-cbc-md5      host/my.host.name@MY.REALM
          1   des-cbc-md4      host/my.host.name@MY.REALM
          1   des-cbc-crc      host/my.host.name@MY.REALM
          1   des3-cbc-sha1    host/my.host.name@MY.REALM


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver,  Next: Remote administration,  Prev: keytabs,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.6 Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver
===================================

Heimdal can be configured to support 524, Kerberos 4 or kaserver. All
these services are turned off by default. Kerberos 4 is always
supported by the KDC, but the Kerberos 4 client support also depends on
Kerberos 4 support having been included at compile-time, using
`--with-krb4=dir'.

4.6.1 524
---------

524 is a service that allows the KDC to convert Kerberos 5 tickets to
Kerberos 4 tickets for backward compatibility. See also Using 2b tokens
with AFS in *Note Things in search for a better place::.

524 can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file

     [kdc]
     	enable-524 = yes

4.6.2 Kerberos 4
----------------

Kerberos 4 is the predecessor to to Kerberos 5. It only supports single
DES. You should only enable Kerberos 4 support if you have needs for
compatibility with an installed base of Kerberos 4 clients/servers.

Kerberos 4 can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file

     [kdc]
     	enable-kerberos4 = yes

4.6.3 kaserver
--------------

Kaserver is a Kerberos 4 that is used in AFS.  The protocol has some
extra features over plain Kerberos 4, but like Kerberos 4, only uses
single DES.

You should only enable Kaserver support if you have needs for
compatibility with an installed base of AFS machines.

Kaserver can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file

     [kdc]
     	enable-kaserver = yes


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Remote administration,  Next: Password changing,  Prev: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.7 Remote administration
=========================

The administration server, `kadmind', can be started by `inetd' (which
isn't recommended) or run as a normal daemon. If you want to start it
from `inetd' you should add a line similar to the one below to your
`/etc/inetd.conf'.

     kerberos-adm stream     tcp     nowait  root /usr/heimdal/libexec/kadmind kadmind

You might need to add `kerberos-adm' to your `/etc/services' as
`749/tcp'.

Access to the administration server is controlled by an ACL file,
(default `/var/heimdal/kadmind.acl'.) The file has the following syntax:
     principal       [priv1,priv2,...]       [glob-pattern]

The matching is from top to bottom for matching principals (and if
given, glob-pattern).  When there is a match, the access rights of that
line are applied.

The privileges you can assign to a principal are: `add',
`change-password' (or `cpw' for short), `delete', `get', `list', and
`modify', or the special privilege `all'. All of these roughly
correspond to the different commands in `kadmin'.

If a GLOB-PATTERN is given on a line, it restricts the access rights
for the principal to only apply for subjects that match the pattern.
The patterns are of the same type as those used in shell globbing, see
fnmatch(3).

In the example below `lha/admin' can change every principal in the
database. `jimmy/admin' can only modify principals that belong to the
realm `E.KTH.SE'. `mille/admin' is working at the help desk, so he
should only be able to change the passwords for single component
principals (ordinary users). He will not be able to change any `/admin'
principal.

     lha/admin@E.KTH.SE	all
     jimmy/admin@E.KTH.SE	all		*@E.KTH.SE
     jimmy/admin@E.KTH.SE	all		*/*@E.KTH.SE
     mille/admin@E.KTH.SE	change-password	*@E.KTH.SE


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Password changing,  Next: Testing clients and servers,  Prev: Remote administration,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.8 Password changing
=====================

To allow users to change their passwords, you should run `kpasswdd'.
It is not run from `inetd'.

You might need to add `kpasswd' to your `/etc/services' as `464/udp'.

4.8.1 Password quality assurance
--------------------------------

It is important that users have good passwords, both to make it harder
to guess them and to avoid off-line attacks (although
pre-authentication provides some defence against off-line attacks).  To
ensure that the users choose good passwords, you can enable password
quality controls in `kpasswdd' and `kadmind'.  The controls themselves
are done in a shared library or an external program that is used by
`kpasswdd'.  To configure in these controls, add lines similar to the
following to your `/etc/krb5.conf':

     [password_quality]
     	policies = external-check builtin:minimum-length module:policyname
     	external_program = /bin/false
     	policy_libraries = LIBRARY1.SO LIBRARY2.SO

In `[password_quality]policies' the module name is optional if the
policy name is unique in all modules (members of `policy_libraries').

The built-in polices are

   * external-check

     Executes the program specified by
     `[password_quality]external_program'.

     A number of key/value pairs are passed as input to the program,
     one per line, ending with the string `end'.  The key/value lines
     are of the form
          principal: PRINCIPAL
          new-password: PASSWORD
     where PASSWORD is the password to check for the previous PRINCIPAL.

     If the external application approves the password, it should return
     `APPROVED' on standard out and exit with exit code 0.  If it
     doesn't approve the password, an one line error message explaining
     the problem should be returned on standard error and the
     application should exit with exit code 0.  In case of a fatal
     error, the application should, if possible, print an error message
     on standard error and exit with a non-zero error code.

   * minimum-length

     The minimum length password quality check reads the configuration
     file stanza `[password_quality]min_length' and requires the
     password to be at least this length.

   * character-class

     The character-class password quality check reads the configuration
     file stanza `[password_quality]min_classes'. The policy requires
     the password to have characters from at least that many character
     classes. Default value if not given is 3.

     The four different characters classes are, uppercase, lowercase,
     number, special characters.


If you want to write your own shared object to check password policies,
see the manual page `kadm5_pwcheck(3)'.

Code for a password quality checking function that uses the cracklib
library can be found in `lib/kadm5/sample_password_check.c' in the
source code distribution.  It requires that the cracklib library be
built with the patch available at
`ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/krb/src/cracklib.patch'.

A sample policy external program is included in
`lib/kadm5/check-cracklib.pl'.

If no password quality checking function is configured, the only check
performed is that the password is at least six characters long.

To check the password policy settings, use the command
`password-quality' in `kadmin' program. The password verification is
only performed locally, on the client.  It may be convenient to set the
environment variable `KRB5_CONFIG' to point to a test version of
`krb5.conf' while you're testing the `[password_quality]' stanza that
way.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Testing clients and servers,  Next: Slave Servers,  Prev: Password changing,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.9 Testing clients and servers
===============================

Now you should be able to run all the clients and servers.  Refer to the
appropriate man pages for information on how to use them.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Slave Servers,  Next: Incremental propagation,  Prev: Testing clients and servers,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.10 Slave servers, Incremental propagation, Testing clients and servers, Setting up a realm
============================================================================================

It is desirable to have at least one backup (slave) server in case the
master server fails. It is possible to have any number of such slave
servers but more than three usually doesn't buy much more redundancy.

All Kerberos servers for a realm must have the same database so that
they present the same service to the users.  The `hprop' program,
running on the master, will propagate the database to the slaves,
running `hpropd' processes.

Every slave needs a database directory, the master key (if it was used
for the database) and a keytab with the principal `hprop/HOSTNAME'.
Add the principal with the `ktutil' command and start `hpropd', as
follows:

     slave# ktutil get -p foo/admin hprop/`hostname`
     slave# mkdir /var/heimdal
     slave# hpropd

The master will use the principal `kadmin/hprop' to authenticate to the
slaves.  This principal should be added when running `kadmin -l init'
but if you do not have it in your database for whatever reason, please
add it with `kadmin -l add'.

Then run `hprop' on the master:

     master# hprop slave

This was just an hands-on example to make sure that everything was
working properly.  Doing it manually is of course the wrong way, and to
automate this you will want to start `hpropd' from `inetd' on the
slave(s) and regularly run `hprop' on the master to regularly propagate
the database.  Starting the propagation once an hour from `cron' is
probably a good idea.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Incremental propagation,  Next: Salting,  Prev: Slave Servers,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.11 Incremental propagation
============================

There is also a newer, and still somewhat experimental, mechanism for
doing incremental propagation in Heimdal.  Instead of sending the whole
database regularly, it sends the changes as they happen on the master to
the slaves.  The master keeps track of all the changes by assigning a
version number to every change to the database.  The slaves know which
was the latest version they saw and in this way it can be determined if
they are in sync or not.  A log of all the changes is kept on the
master, and when a slave is at an older version than the oldest one in
the log, the whole database has to be sent.

Protocol-wise, all the slaves connect to the master and as a greeting
tell it the latest version that they have (`IHAVE' message).  The
master then responds by sending all the changes between that version and
the current version at the master (a series of `FORYOU' messages) or
the whole database in a `TELLYOUEVERYTHING' message.  There is also a
keep-alive protocol that makes sure all slaves are up and running.

4.11.1 Configuring incremental propagation
------------------------------------------

The program that runs on the master is `ipropd-master' and all clients
run `ipropd-slave'.

Create the file `/var/heimdal/slaves' on the master containing all the
slaves that the database should be propagated to.  Each line contains
the full name of the principal (for example
`iprop/hemligare.foo.se@FOO.SE').

You should already have `iprop/tcp' defined as 2121, in your
`/etc/services'.  Otherwise, or if you need to use a different port for
some peculiar reason, you can use the `--port' option.  This is useful
when you have multiple realms to distribute from one server.

Then you need to create those principals that you added in the
configuration file.  Create one `iprop/hostname' for the master and for
every slave.

     master# /usr/heimdal/sbin/ktutil get iprop/`hostname`

The next step is to start the `ipropd-master' process on the master
server.  The `ipropd-master' listens on the UNIX domain socket
`/var/heimdal/signal' to know when changes have been made to the
database so they can be propagated to the slaves.  There is also a
safety feature of testing the version number regularly (every 30
seconds) to see if it has been modified by some means that do not raise
this signal.  Then, start `ipropd-slave' on all the slaves:

     master# /usr/heimdal/libexec/ipropd-master &
     slave#  /usr/heimdal/libexec/ipropd-slave master &

To manage the iprop log file you should use the `iprop-log' command.
With it you can dump, truncate and reply the logfile.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Salting,  Next: Cross realm,  Prev: Incremental propagation,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.12 Salting
============

Salting is used to make it harder to pre-calculate all possible keys.
Using a salt increases the search space to make it almost impossible to
pre-calculate all keys. Salting is the process of mixing a public
string (the salt) with the password, then sending it through an
encryption type specific string-to-key function that will output the
fixed size encryption key.

In Kerberos 5 the salt is determined by the encryption-type, except in
some special cases.

In `des' there is the Kerberos 4 salt (none at all) or the afs-salt
(using the cell (realm in AFS lingo)).

In `arcfour' (the encryption type that Microsoft Windows 2000 uses)
there is no salt. This is to be compatible with NTLM keys in Windows NT
4.

`[kadmin]default_keys' in `krb5.conf' controls what salting to use.

The syntax of `[kadmin]default_keys' is
`[etype:]salt-type[:salt-string]'. `etype' is the encryption type (des,
des3, arcfour), `salt-type' is the type of salt (pw-salt or afs3-salt),
and the salt-string is the string that will be used as salt (remember
that if the salt is appended/prepended, the empty salt "" is the same
thing as no salt at all).

Common types of salting include

   * `v4' (or `des:pw-salt:')

     The Kerberos 4 salting is using no salt at all. Reason there is
     colon at the end of the salt string is that it makes the salt the
     empty string (same as no salt).

   * `v5' (or `pw-salt')

     `pw-salt' uses the default salt for each encryption type is
     specified for. If the encryption type `etype' isn't given, all
     default encryption will be used.

   * `afs3-salt'

     `afs3-salt' is the salt that is used with Transarc kaserver. Its
     the cell name appended to the password.



File: heimdal.info,  Node: Cross realm,  Next: Transit policy,  Prev: Salting,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.13 Cross realm
================

Suppose you reside in the realm `MY.REALM', how do you authenticate to
a server in `OTHER.REALM'? Having valid tickets in `MY.REALM' allows
you to communicate with Kerberised services in that realm. However, the
computer in the other realm does not have a secret key shared with the
Kerberos server in your realm.

It is possible to share keys between two realms that trust each other.
When a client program, such as `telnet' or `ssh', finds that the other
computer is in a different realm, it will try to get a ticket granting
ticket for that other realm, but from the local Kerberos server. With
that ticket granting ticket, it will then obtain service tickets from
the Kerberos server in the other realm.

For a two way trust between `MY.REALM' and `OTHER.REALM' add the
following principals to each realm. The principals should be
`krbtgt/OTHER.REALM@MY.REALM' and `krbtgt/MY.REALM@OTHER.REALM' in
`MY.REALM', and `krbtgt/MY.REALM@OTHER.REALM' and
`krbtgt/OTHER.REALM@MY.REALM'in `OTHER.REALM'.

In Kerberos 5 the trust can be configured to be one way. So that users
from `MY.REALM' can authenticate to services in `OTHER.REALM', but not
the opposite. In the example above, the `krbtgt/MY.REALM@OTHER.REALM'
then should be removed.

The two principals must have the same key, key version number, and the
same set of encryption types. Remember to transfer the two keys in a
safe manner.

     vr$ klist
     Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_913.console
             Principal: lha@E.KTH.SE

       Issued           Expires          Principal
     May  3 13:55:52  May  3 23:55:54  krbtgt/E.KTH.SE@E.KTH.SE

     vr$ telnet -l lha hummel.it.su.se
     Trying 2001:6b0:5:1095:250:fcff:fe24:dbf...
     Connected to hummel.it.su.se.
     Escape character is '^]'.
     Waiting for encryption to be negotiated...
     [ Trying mutual KERBEROS5 (host/hummel.it.su.se@SU.SE)... ]
     [ Kerberos V5 accepts you as ``lha@E.KTH.SE'' ]
     Encryption negotiated.
     Last login: Sat May  3 14:11:47 from vr.l.nxs.se
     hummel$ exit

     vr$ klist
     Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_913.console
             Principal: lha@E.KTH.SE

       Issued           Expires          Principal
     May  3 13:55:52  May  3 23:55:54  krbtgt/E.KTH.SE@E.KTH.SE
     May  3 13:55:56  May  3 23:55:54  krbtgt/SU.SE@E.KTH.SE
     May  3 14:10:54  May  3 23:55:54  host/hummel.it.su.se@SU.SE


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Transit policy,  Next: Setting up DNS,  Prev: Cross realm,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.14 Transit policy
===================

If you want to use cross realm authentication through an intermediate
realm, it must be explicitly allowed by either the KDCs or the server
receiving the request. This is done in `krb5.conf' in the `[capaths]'
section.

When the ticket transits through a realm to another realm, the
destination realm adds its peer to the "transited-realms" field in the
ticket. The field is unordered, since there is no way to know if know
if one of the transited-realms changed the order of the list.

The syntax for `[capaths]' section:

     [capaths]
             CLIENT-REALM = {
                     SERVER-REALM = PERMITTED-CROSS-REALMS ...
             }

The realm `STACKEN.KTH.SE' allows clients from `SU.SE' and `DSV.SU.SE'
to cross it. Since `STACKEN.KTH.SE' only has direct cross realm setup
with `KTH.SE', and `DSV.SU.SE' only has direct cross realm setup with
`SU.SE' they need to use both `SU.SE' and `KTH.SE' as transit realms.

     [capaths]
     	SU.SE = {
                         STACKEN.KTH.SE = KTH.SE
     	}
     	DSV.SU.SE = {
                         STACKEN.KTH.SE = SU.SE KTH.SE
     	}

The order of the `PERMITTED-CROSS-REALMS' is not important when doing
transit cross realm verification.

However, the order is important when the `[capaths]' section is used to
figure out the intermediate realm to go to when doing multi-realm
transit. When figuring out the next realm, the first realm of the list
of `PERMITTED-CROSS-REALMS' is chosen. This is done in both the client
kerberos library and the KDC.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Setting up DNS,  Next: Using LDAP to store the database,  Prev: Transit policy,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.15 Setting up DNS
===================

4.15.1 Using DNS to find KDC
----------------------------

If there is information about where to find the KDC or kadmind for a
realm in the `krb5.conf' for a realm, that information will be
preferred, and DNS will not be queried.

Heimdal will try to use DNS to find the KDCs for a realm. First it will
try to find a `SRV' resource record (RR) for the realm. If no SRV RRs
are found, it will fall back to looking for an `A' RR for a machine
named kerberos.REALM, and then kerberos-1.REALM, etc

Adding this information to DNS minimises the client configuration (in
the common case, resulting in no configuration needed) and allows the
system administrator to change the number of KDCs and on what machines
they are running without caring about clients.

The downside of using DNS is that the client might be fooled to use the
wrong server if someone fakes DNS replies/data, but storing the IP
addresses of the KDC on all the clients makes it very hard to change
the infrastructure.

An example of the configuration for the realm `EXAMPLE.COM':


     $ORIGIN example.com.
     _kerberos._tcp          SRV     10 1 88 kerberos.example.com.
     _kerberos._udp          SRV     10 1 88 kerberos.example.com.
     _kerberos._tcp          SRV     10 1 88 kerberos-1.example.com.
     _kerberos._udp          SRV     10 1 88 kerberos-1.example.com.
     _kpasswd._udp           SRV     10 1 464 kerberos.example.com.
     _kerberos-adm._tcp	SRV	10 1 749 kerberos.example.com.

More information about DNS SRV resource records can be found in
RFC-2782 (A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)).

4.15.2 Using DNS to map hostname to Kerberos realm
--------------------------------------------------

Heimdal also supports a way to lookup a realm from a hostname. This to
minimise configuration needed on clients. Using this has the drawback
that clients can be redirected by an attacker to realms within the same
cross realm trust and made to believe they are talking to the right
server (since Kerberos authentication will succeed).

An example configuration that informs clients that for the realms
it.example.com and srv.example.com, they should use the realm
EXAMPLE.COM:


     $ORIGIN example.com.
     _kerberos.it		TXT     "EXAMPLE.COM"
     _kerberos.srv		TXT     "EXAMPLE.COM"


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Using LDAP to store the database,  Next: Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs,  Prev: Setting up DNS,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.16 Using LDAP to store the database
=====================================

This document describes how to install the LDAP backend for Heimdal.
Note that before attempting to configure such an installation, you
should be aware of the implications of storing private information
(such as users' keys) in a directory service primarily designed for
public information. Nonetheless, with a suitable authorisation policy,
it is possible to set this up in a secure fashion. A knowledge of LDAP,
Kerberos, and C is necessary to install this backend. The HDB schema
was devised by Leif Johansson.

Requirements:

   * A current release of Heimdal, configured with
     `--with-openldap=/usr/local' (adjust according to where you have
     installed OpenLDAP).

     You can verify that you manage to configure LDAP support by running
     `kdc --builtin-hdb', and checking that `ldap:' is one entry in the
     list.

     Its also possible to configure the ldap backend as a shared module,
     see option -hdb-openldap-module to configure.

   * OpenLDAP 2.0.x. Configure OpenLDAP with `--enable-local' to enable
     the local transport. (A patch to support SASL EXTERNAL
     authentication is necessary in order to use OpenLDAP 2.1.x.)

   * Add the hdb schema to the LDAP server, its included in the
     source-tree in `lib/hdb/hdb.schema'. Example from slapd.conf:

          include /usr/local/etc/openldap/schema/hdb.schema

   * Configure the LDAP server ACLs to accept writes from clients over
     the local transport. For example:

          access to *
                  by dn.exact="uid=heimdal,dc=services,dc=example,dc=com" write
                  ...

          sasl-regexp "uidNumber=0\\\+gidNumber=.*,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth"
          	"uid=heimdal,dc=services,dc=example,dc=com"

     The sasl-regexp is for mapping between the SASL/EXTERNAL and a
     user in a tree.  The user that the key is mapped to should be have
     a krb5Principal aux object with krb5PrincipalName set so that the
     "creator" and "modifier" is right in `kadmin'.

     Another option is to create an admins group and add the dn to that
     group.

     Since Heimdal talks to the LDAP server over a UNIX domain socket,
     and uses external sasl authentication, its not possible to require
     security layer quality (ssf in cyrus-sasl lingo). So that
     requirement has to be turned off in OpenLDAP `slapd' configuration
     file `slapd.conf'.

          sasl-secprops minssf=0

   *  Start `slapd' with the local listener (as well as the default
     TCP/IP listener on port 389) as follows:

              slapd -h "ldapi:/// ldap:///"

     Note: These is a bug in `slapd' where it appears to corrupt the
     krb5Key binary attribute on shutdown. This may be related to our
     use of the V3 schema definition syntax instead of the old
     UMich-style, V2 syntax.

   * You should specify the distinguished name under which your
     principals will be stored in `krb5.conf'. Also you need to enter
     the path to the kadmin acl file:

          [kdc]
                  database = {
                          dbname = ldap:ou=KerberosPrincipals,dc=example,dc=com
                          hdb-ldap-structural-object = inetOrgPerson
                          acl_file = /path/to/kadmind.acl
                          mkey_file = /path/to/mkey
                  }

     `mkey_file' can be excluded if you feel that you trust your ldap
     directory to have the raw keys inside it.  The
     hdb-ldap-structural-object is not necessary if you do not need
     Samba comatibility.

   * Once you have built Heimdal and started the LDAP server, run kadmin
     (as usual) to initialise the database. Note that the instructions
     for stashing a master key are as per any Heimdal installation.

          kdc# kadmin -l
          kadmin> init EXAMPLE.COM
          Realm max ticket life [unlimited]:
          Realm max renewable ticket life [unlimited]:
          kadmin> ank lukeh
          Max ticket life [1 day]:
          Max renewable life [1 week]:
          Principal expiration time [never]:
          Password expiration time [never]:
          Attributes []:
          lukeh@EXAMPLE.COM's Password:
          Verifying password - lukeh@EXAMPLE.COM's Password:
          kadmin> exit

     Verify that the principal database has indeed been stored in the
     directory with the following command:

          kdc# ldapsearch -L -h localhost -D cn=manager \
           -w secret -b ou=KerberosPrincipals,dc=example,dc=com \
           'objectclass=krb5KDCEntry'

   * Now consider adding indexes to the database to speed up the
     access, at least theses should be added to slapd.conf.

          index	objectClass		eq
          index	cn			eq,sub,pres
          index	uid			eq,sub,pres
          index	displayName		eq,sub,pres
          index	krb5PrincipalName	eq


4.16.1 Troubleshooting guide
----------------------------

`https://sec.miljovern.no/bin/view/Info/TroubleshootingGuide'

4.16.2 Using Samba LDAP password database
-----------------------------------------

The Samba domain and the Kerberos realm can have different names since
arcfour's string to key functions principal/realm independent.  So now
will be your first and only chance name your Kerberos realm without
needing to deal with old configuration files.

First, you should set up Samba and get that working with LDAP backend.

Now you can proceed as in *Note Using LDAP to store the database::.
Heimdal will pick up the Samba LDAP entries if they are in the same
search space as the Kerberos entries.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs,  Next: Setting up PK-INIT,  Prev: Using LDAP to store the database,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.17 Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs
===========================================================

Some services require Kerberos credentials when they start to make
connections to other services or need to use them when they have
started.

The easiest way to get tickets for a service is to store the key in a
keytab. Both ktutil get and kadmin ext can be used to get a keytab.
ktutil get is better in that way it changes the key/password for the
user. This is also the problem with ktutil. If ktutil is used for the
same service principal on several hosts, they keytab will only be
useful on the last host. In that case, run the extract command on one
host and then securely copy the keytab around to all other hosts that
need it.

     host# ktutil -k /etc/krb5-service.keytab \
           get -p lha/admin@EXAMPLE.ORG service-principal@EXAMPLE.ORG
     lha/admin@EXAMPLE.ORG's Password:

To get a Kerberos credential file for the service, use kinit in the
-keytab mode. This will not ask for a password but instead fetch the
key from the keytab.

     service@host$ kinit --cache=/var/run/service_krb5_cache \
                    --keytab=/etc/krb5-service.keytab \
            service-principal@EXAMPLE.ORG

Long running services might need credentials longer then the expiration
time of the tickets. kinit can run in a mode that refreshes the tickets
before they expire. This is useful for services that write into AFS and
other distributed file systems using Kerberos. To run the long running
script, just append the program and arguments (if any) after the
principal. kinit will stop refreshing credentials and remove the
credentials when the script-to-start-service exits.

     service@host$ kinit --cache=/var/run/service_krb5_cache \
            --keytab=/etc/krb5-service.keytab \
            service-principal@EXAMPLE.ORG \
            script-to-start-service argument1 argument2


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Setting up PK-INIT,  Prev: Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs,  Up: Setting up a realm

4.18 Setting up PK-INIT
=======================

PK-INIT is levering the existing PKI infrastructure to use certificates
to get the initial ticket, that is usually the krbtgt.

To use PK-INIT you must first have a PKI, so if you don't have one, now
its time to create it. Note that you should read the whole chapter of
the document to see the requirements on the CA sortware.

There needs to exist a mapping between the certificate and what
principals that certificate is allowed to use. There are several ways
to do this. The administrator can use a configuration file, storing the
principal in SubjectAltName in extensions of certificate, or store the
mapping in the principals entry in the kerberos database.

4.19 Certificates
=================

This section document the requirements on the KDC and client
certificates and the format used in the id-pkinit-san OtherName
extention.

4.19.1 KDC certificate
----------------------

The certificate for the KDC have serveral requirements.

First the certificate should have a Extended Key Usage (EKU)
id-pkkdcekuoid (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5) set. Second there must be a
subjectAltName otherName using oid id-pkinit-san (1.3.6.1.5.2.2) in the
type field and and DER encoded KRB5PrincipalName that matches the name
of the TGS of the target realm.

Both of these two requirements are not required by the standard to be
checked by the client if it have external information what the
certificate the KDC is supposed to be used. So its in the interst of
minimum amount of configuration on the clients they should be included.

Remember that if client would accept any certificate as the KDC's
certificate, the client could be fooled into trusting something that
isn't a KDC and thus expose the user to giving away information (like
password or other private information) that it is supposed to secret.

Also, if the certificate have a nameConstraints extention with a
Generalname with dNSName or iPAdress it must match the hostname or
adress of the KDC.

4.19.2 Client certificate
-------------------------

The client certificate may need to have a EKU id-pkekuoid
(1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4) depending on set on the certifiate on the KDC.

It possible to store the principal (if allowed by the KDC) in the
certificate and thus delegate responsibility to do the mapping between
certificates and principals to the CA.

4.19.2.1 Using KRB5PrincipalName in id-pkinit-san
.................................................

OtherName extenetion in the GeneralName is used is used to do the
mapping between certifiate and principal in the certifiate or storing
the krbtgt principal in the KDC certificate.

The principal is stored in a SubjectAltName in the certificate using
OtherName. The oid in the type is id-pkinit-san.

     id-pkinit-san OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso (1) org (3) dod (6)
     internet (1) security (5) kerberosv5 (2) 2 }

In the data part of the OtherName is filled with the following DER
encoded ASN.1 structure:

     KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
     	realm [0] Realm,
     	principalName [1] PrincipalName
     }

where Realm and PrincipalName is defined by Kerberos ASN.1
specification.

4.20 Naming certificate using hx509
===================================

hx509 is the X.509 software used in Heimdal to handle certificates.
hx509 use diffrent syntaxs to specify the diffrent format the
certificate is stored and in what format they exist in.

There are several format that can be used, PEM, embeded into PKCS12
files, embeded into PKCS11 devices and raw DER encoded certificates.
Below is a list of types to use.

DIR:
     DIR is reading all certificates in a directory that is DER or PEM
     formated.

     The main feature of DIR is that the directory is read on demand
     when iterating over certificates, that way appliction can for some
     cases avoid storeing all certificates in memory. Its very useful
     for tests that iterates over larger amount of certificates.

     Syntax is:

          DIR:/path/to/der/files

FILE:
     FILE: is used to have the lib pick up a certificate chain and a
     private key. The fil can be either a PEM (openssl) file or a raw
     DER encoded certificate. If its a PEM file it can contain several
     keys and certificates and the code will try to match the private
     key and certificate togehter.

     Its useful to have one PEM file that contains all the trust
     anchors.

     Syntax is:

          FILE:certificate.pem,private-key.key,other-cert.pem,....

PKCS11:
     PKCS11: is used handle smartcards via PKCS11 drivers, for example
     soft-token opensc, or muscle. Default is to use all slots on the
     device/token.

     Syntax is:

          PKCS11:shared-object.so

PKCS12:
     PKCS12: is used handle PKCS12 files. PKCS12 files commonly have the
     extension pfx or p12.

     Syntax is:

          PKCS12:/path/to/file.pfx


4.21 Configure the Kerberos software
====================================

First configure the client's trust anchors and what parameters to
verify, see subsection below how to do that. Now you can use kinit to
get yourself tickets. One example how that can look it like this:

     $ kinit -C FILE:$HOME/.certs/lha.crt,$HOME/.certs/lha.key lha@EXAMPLE.ORG
     Enter your private key passphrase:
     : lha@nutcracker ; klist
     Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_19100a
             Principal: lha@EXAMPLE.ORG

       Issued           Expires          Principal
     Apr 20 02:08:08  Apr 20 12:08:08  krbtgt/EXAMPLE.ORG@EXAMPLE.ORG

Using PKCS11 it can look like this instead:

     $ kinit -C PKCS11:/tmp/pkcs11/lib/soft-pkcs11.so lha@EXAMPLE.ORG
     PIN code for SoftToken (slot):
     $ klist
     Credentials cache: API:4
             Principal: lha@EXAMPLE.ORG

       Issued           Expires          Principal
     Mar 26 23:40:10  Mar 27 09:40:10  krbtgt/EXAMPLE.ORG@EXAMPLE.ORG

Write about the kdc.

4.22 Configure the client
=========================

     [appdefaults]
     	pkinit_anchors = FILE:/path/to/trust-anchors.pem

     [realms]
             EXAMPLE.COM = {
     		pkinit_require_eku = true
     		pkinit_require_krbtgt_otherName = true
     		pkinit_win2k = no
     		pkinit_win2k_require_binding = yes
     	}

4.23 Configure the KDC
======================

     [kdc]
     	enable-pkinit = yes
     	pkinit_identity = FILE:/secure/kdc.crt,/secure/kdc.key
     	pkinit_anchors = FILE:/path/to/trust-anchors.pem
     	pkinit_pool = PKCS12:/path/to/useful-intermediate-certs.pfx
     	pkinit_pool = FILE:/path/to/other-useful-intermediate-certs.pem
     	pkinit_allow_proxy_certificate = false

4.23.1 Using pki-mapping file
-----------------------------

Note that the file this is space sensitive.

     # cat /var/heimdal/pki-mapping
     # comments starts with #
     lha@EXAMPLE.ORG:C=SE,O=Stockholm universitet,CN=Love,UID=lha
     lha@EXAMPLE.ORG:CN=Love,UID=lha

4.23.2 Using Kerberos database
------------------------------

4.24 Use OpenSSL to create certificates
=======================================

This section tries to give the CA owners hints how to create
certificates using OpenSSL (or CA software based on OpenSSL).

4.24.1 Using OpenSSL to create certificate with krb5PrincipalName
-----------------------------------------------------------------

To make OpenSSL create certificate with krb5PrincipalName use
`openssl.cnf' as described below. To see an complete example of
creating client and KDC certificates, see the test-data generation
script `lib/hx509/data/gen-req.sh' in the source-tree. The certicates
it creates are used to test the PK-INIT functionality in
`tests/kdc/check-kdc.in'.

To use this example you have to use OpenSSL 0.9.8a or later.


     [user_certificate]
     subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:princ_name

     [princ_name]
     realm = EXP:0, GeneralString:MY.REALM
     principal_name = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:principal_seq

     [principal_seq]
     name_type = EXP:0, INTEGER:1
     name_string = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:principals

     [principals]
     princ1 = GeneralString:userid

Command usage

     openssl x509 -extensions user_certificate
     openssl ca -extensions user_certificate

4.25 Using PK-INIT with Windows
===============================

4.25.1 Client configration
--------------------------

Clients using a Windows KDC with PK-INIT need configuration since
windows uses pre-standard format and this can't be autodetected.

The pkinit_win2k_require_binding option requires the reply for the KDC
to be of the new, secure, type that binds the request to reply. Before
clients should fake the reply from the KDC. To use this option you have
to apply a fix from Microsoft.

     [realms]
             MY.MS.REALM = {
                     pkinit_win2k = yes
                     pkinit_win2k_require_binding = no
     	}

4.25.2 Certificates
-------------------

The client certificates needs to have the extended keyusage "Microsoft
Smartcardlogin" (openssl have the oid shortname msSmartcardLogin).

See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article - 281245 "Guidelines for Enabling
Smart Card Logon with Third-Party Certification Authorities" for a more
extensive description of how set setup an external CA to it includes
all information that will make a Windows KDC happy.

4.25.3 Configure Windows 2000 CA
--------------------------------

To enable Microsoft Smartcardlogin> for certificates in your Windows
2000 CA, you want to look at Microsoft Knowledge Base Article - 313274
"HOW TO: Configure a Certification Authority to Issue Smart Card
Certificates in Windows".


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Applications,  Next: Things in search for a better place,  Prev: Setting up a realm,  Up: Top

5 Applications
**************

* Menu:

* Authentication modules::
* AFS::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Authentication modules,  Next: AFS,  Prev: Applications,  Up: Applications

5.1 Authentication modules
==========================

The problem of having different authentication mechanisms has been
recognised by several vendors, and several solutions have appeared. In
most cases these solutions involve some kind of shared modules that are
loaded at run-time.  Modules for some of these systems can be found in
`lib/auth'.  Presently there are modules for Digital's SIA, and IRIX'
`login' and `xdm' (in `lib/auth/afskauthlib').

* Menu:

* Digital SIA::
* IRIX::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Digital SIA,  Next: IRIX,  Prev: Authentication modules,  Up: Authentication modules

5.1.1 Digital SIA
-----------------

How to install the SIA module depends on which OS version you're
running. Tru64 5.0 has a new command, `siacfg', which makes this
process quite simple. If you have this program, you should just be able
to run:
     siacfg -a KRB5 /usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so

On older versions, or if you want to do it by hand, you have to do the
following (not tested by us on Tru64 5.0):

   * Make sure `libsia_krb5.so' is available in `/usr/athena/lib'. If
     `/usr/athena' is not on local disk, you might want to put it in
     `/usr/shlib' or someplace else. If you do, you'll have to edit
     `krb5_matrix.conf' to reflect the new location (you will also have
     to do this if you installed in some other directory than
     `/usr/athena'). If you built with shared libraries, you will have
     to copy the shared `libkrb.so', `libdes.so', `libkadm.so', and
     `libkafs.so' to a place where the loader can find them (such as
     `/usr/shlib').

   * Copy (your possibly edited) `krb5_matrix.conf' to `/etc/sia'.

   * Apply `security.patch' to `/sbin/init.d/security'.

   * Turn on KRB5 security by issuing `rcmgr set SECURITY KRB5' and
     `rcmgr set KRB5_MATRIX_CONF krb5_matrix.conf'.

   * Digital thinks you should reboot your machine, but that really
     shouldn't be necessary.  It's usually sufficient just to run
     `/sbin/init.d/security start' (and restart any applications that
     use SIA, like `xdm'.)

Users with local passwords (like `root') should be able to login safely.

When using Digital's xdm the `KRB5CCNAME' environment variable isn't
passed along as it should (since xdm zaps the environment). Instead you
have to set `KRB5CCNAME' to the correct value in
`/usr/lib/X11/xdm/Xsession'. Add a line similar to
     KRB5CCNAME=FILE:/tmp/krb5cc`id -u`_`ps -o ppid= -p $$`; export KRB5CCNAME
If you use CDE, `dtlogin' allows you to specify which additional
environment variables it should export. To add `KRB5CCNAME' to this
list, edit `/usr/dt/config/Xconfig', and look for the definition of
`exportList'. You want to add something like:
     Dtlogin.exportList:     KRB5CCNAME

Notes to users with Enhanced security
.....................................

Digital's `ENHANCED' (C2) security, and Kerberos solve two different
problems. C2 deals with local security, adds better control of who can
do what, auditing, and similar things. Kerberos deals with network
security.

To make C2 security work with Kerberos you will have to do the
following.

   * Replace all occurrences of `krb5_matrix.conf' with
     `krb5+c2_matrix.conf' in the directions above.

   * You must enable "vouching" in the `default' database.  This will
     make the OSFC2 module trust other SIA modules, so you can login
     without giving your C2 password. To do this use `edauth' to edit
     the default entry `/usr/tcb/bin/edauth -dd default', and add a
     `d_accept_alternate_vouching' capability, if not already present.

   * For each user who does _not_ have a local C2 password, you should
     set the password expiration field to zero. You can do this for each
     user, or in the `default' table. To do this use `edauth' to set
     (or change) the `u_exp' capability to `u_exp#0'.

   * You also need to be aware that the shipped `login', `rcp', and
     `rshd', don't do any particular C2 magic (such as checking for
     various forms of disabled accounts), so if you rely on those
     features, you shouldn't use those programs. If you configure with
     `--enable-osfc2', these programs will, however, set the login UID.
     Still: use at your own risk.

At present `su' does not accept the vouching flag, so it will not work
as expected.

Also, kerberised ftp will not work with C2 passwords. You can solve this
by using both Digital's ftpd and our on different ports.

*Remember*, if you do these changes you will get a system that most
certainly does _not_ fulfil the requirements of a C2 system. If C2 is
what you want, for instance if someone else is forcing you to use it,
you're out of luck.  If you use enhanced security because you want a
system that is more secure than it would otherwise be, you probably got
an even more secure system. Passwords will not be sent in the clear,
for instance.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: IRIX,  Prev: Digital SIA,  Up: Authentication modules

5.1.2 IRIX
----------

The IRIX support is a module that is compatible with Transarc's
`afskauthlib.so'.  It should work with all programs that use this
library. This should include `login' and `xdm'.

The interface is not very documented but it seems that you have to copy
`libkafs.so', `libkrb.so', and `libdes.so' to `/usr/lib', or build your
`afskauthlib.so' statically.

The `afskauthlib.so' itself is able to reside in `/usr/vice/etc',
`/usr/afsws/lib', or the current directory (wherever that is).

IRIX 6.4 and newer seem to have all programs (including `xdm' and
`login') in the N32 object format, whereas in older versions they were
O32. For it to work, the `afskauthlib.so' library has to be in the same
object format as the program that tries to load it. This might require
that you have to configure and build for O32 in addition to the default
N32.

Apart from this it should "just work"; there are no configuration files.

Note that recent Irix 6.5 versions (at least 6.5.22) have PAM,
including a `pam_krb5.so' module.  Not all relevant programs use PAM,
though, e.g. `ssh'. In particular, for console graphical login you need
to turn off `visuallogin' and turn on `xdm' with `chkconfig'.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: AFS,  Prev: Authentication modules,  Up: Applications

5.2 AFS
=======

AFS is a distributed filesystem that uses Kerberos for authentication.

For more information about AFS see OpenAFS `http://www.openafs.org/'
and Arla `http://www.stacken.kth.se/projekt/arla/'.

5.2.1 How to get a KeyFile
--------------------------

`ktutil -k AFSKEYFILE:KeyFile get afs@MY.REALM'

or you can extract it with kadmin

     kadmin> ext -k AFSKEYFILE:/usr/afs/etc/KeyFile afs@My.CELL.NAME

You have to make sure you have a `des-cbc-md5' encryption type since
that is the enctype that will be converted.

5.2.2 How to convert a srvtab to a KeyFile
------------------------------------------

You need a `/usr/vice/etc/ThisCell' containing the cellname of your
AFS-cell.

`ktutil copy krb4:/root/afs-srvtab AFSKEYFILE:/usr/afs/etc/KeyFile'.

If keyfile already exists, this will add the new key in afs-srvtab to
KeyFile.

5.3 Using 2b tokens with AFS
============================

5.3.1 What is 2b ?
------------------

2b is the name of the proposal that was implemented to give basic
Kerberos 5 support to AFS in rxkad. Its not real Kerberos 5 support
since it still uses fcrypt for data encryption and not Kerberos
encryption types.

Its only possible (in all cases) to do this for DES encryption types
because only then the token (the AFS equivalent of a ticket) will be
smaller than the maximum size that can fit in the token cache in the
OpenAFS/Transarc client. It is a so tight fit that some extra wrapping
on the ASN1/DER encoding is removed from the Kerberos ticket.

2b uses a Kerberos 5 EncTicketPart instead of a Kerberos 4 ditto for
the part of the ticket that is encrypted with the service's key. The
client doesn't know what's inside the encrypted data so to the client
it doesn't matter.

To  differentiate between Kerberos 4 tickets and Kerberos 5 tickets, 2b
uses a special kvno, 213 for 2b tokens and 255 for Kerberos 5 tokens.

Its a requirement that all AFS servers that support 2b also support
native Kerberos 5 in rxkad.

5.3.2 Configuring a Heimdal kdc to use 2b tokens
------------------------------------------------

Support for 2b tokens in the kdc are turned on for specific principals
by adding them to the string list option `[kdc]use_2b' in the kdc's
`krb5.conf' file.

     [kdc]
     	use_2b = {
     		afs@SU.SE = yes
     		afs/it.su.se@SU.SE = yes
     	}

5.3.3 Configuring AFS clients for 2b support
--------------------------------------------

There is no need to configure AFS clients for 2b support. The only
software that needs to be installed/upgrade is a Kerberos 5 enabled
`afslog'.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Things in search for a better place,  Next: Kerberos 4 issues,  Prev: Applications,  Up: Top

6 Things in search for a better place
*************************************

6.1 Making things work on Ciscos
================================

Modern versions of Cisco IOS has some support for authenticating via
Kerberos 5. This can be used both by having the router get a ticket when
you login (boring), and by using Kerberos authenticated telnet to access
your router (less boring). The following has been tested on IOS
11.2(12), things might be different with other versions. Old versions
are known to have bugs.

To make this work, you will first have to configure your router to use
Kerberos (this is explained in the documentation). A sample
configuration looks like the following:

     aaa new-model
     aaa authentication login default krb5-telnet krb5 enable
     aaa authorization exec krb5-instance
     kerberos local-realm FOO.SE
     kerberos srvtab entry host/router.foo.se 0 891725446 4 1 8 012345678901234567
     kerberos server FOO.SE 10.0.0.1
     kerberos instance map admin 15

This tells you (among other things) that when logging in, the router
should try to authenticate with kerberised telnet, and if that fails try
to verify a plain text password via a Kerberos ticket exchange (as
opposed to a local database, RADIUS or something similar), and if that
fails try the local enable password. If you're not careful when you
specify the `login default' authentication mechanism, you might not be
able to login at all. The `instance map' and `authorization exec' lines
says that people with `admin' instances should be given `enabled' shells
when logging in.

The numbers after the principal on the `srvtab' line are principal type,
time stamp (in seconds since 1970), key version number (4), keytype (1
== des), key length (always 8 with des), and then the key.

To make the Heimdal KDC produce tickets that the Cisco can decode you
might have to turn on the `encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep' flag in the KDC.
You will also have to specify that the router can't handle anything but
`des-cbc-crc'. This can be done with the `del_enctype' command of
`kadmin'.

This all fine and so, but unless you have an IOS version with encryption
(available only in the U.S) it doesn't really solve any problems. Sure
you don't have to send your password over the wire, but since the telnet
connection isn't protected it's still possible for someone to steal your
session. This won't be fixed until someone adds integrity to the telnet
protocol.

A working solution would be to hook up a machine with a real operating
system to the console of the Cisco and then use it as a backwards
terminal server.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Kerberos 4 issues,  Next: Windows 2000 compatability,  Prev: Things in search for a better place,  Up: Top

7 Kerberos 4 issues
*******************

The KDC has built-in version 4 support. It is not enabled by default,
see setup how to set it up.

The KDC will also have kaserver emulation and be able to handle
AFS-clients that use `klog'.

* Menu:

* Principal conversion issues::
* Converting a version 4 database::
* kaserver::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Principal conversion issues,  Next: Converting a version 4 database,  Prev: Kerberos 4 issues,  Up: Kerberos 4 issues

7.1 Principal conversion issues
===============================

First, Kerberos 4 and Kerberos 5 principals are different. A version 4
principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A version 5
principal has one or more components, and a realm (the terms "name" and
"instance" are still used, for the first and second component,
respectively).    Also, in some cases the name of a version 4 principal
differs from the first component of the corresponding version 5
principal. One notable example is the "host" type principals, where the
version 4 name is `rcmd' (for "remote command"), and the version 5 name
is `host'. For the class of principals that has a hostname as instance,
there is an other major difference, Kerberos 4 uses only the first
component of the hostname, whereas Kerberos 5 uses the fully qualified
hostname.

Because of this it can be hard or impossible to correctly convert a
version 4 principal to a version 5 principal (1). The biggest problem is
to know if the conversion resulted in a valid principal. To give an
example, suppose you want to convert the principal `rcmd.foo'.

The `rcmd' name suggests that the instance is a hostname (even if there
are exceptions to this rule). To correctly convert the instance `foo'
to a hostname, you have to know which host it is referring to. You can
to this by either guessing (from the realm) which domain name to
append, or you have to have a list of possible hostnames. In the
simplest cases you can cover most principals with the first rule. If you
have several domains sharing a single realm this will not usually work.
If the exceptions are few you can probably come by with a lookup table
for the exceptions.

In a complex scenario you will need some kind of host lookup mechanism.
Using DNS for this is tempting, but DNS is error prone, slow and unsafe
(2).

Fortunately, the KDC has a trump on hand: it can easily tell if a
principal exists in the database. The KDC will use
`krb5_425_conv_principal_ext' to convert principals when handling to
version 4 requests.

---------- Footnotes ----------

(1) the other way is not always trivial either, but usually easier

(2) at least until secure DNS is commonly available


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Converting a version 4 database,  Next: kaserver,  Prev: Principal conversion issues,  Up: Kerberos 4 issues

7.2 Converting a version 4 database
===================================

If you want to convert an existing version 4 database, the principal
conversion issue arises too.

If you decide to convert your database once and for all, you will only
have to do this conversion once. It is also possible to run a version 5
KDC as a slave to a version 4 KDC. In this case this conversion will
happen every time the database is propagated.  When doing this
conversion, there are a few things to look out for. If you have stale
entries in the database, these entries will not be converted. This might
be because these principals are not used anymore, or it might be just
because the principal couldn't be converted.

You might also see problems with a many-to-one mapping of principals.
For instance, if you are using DNS lookups and you have two principals
`rcmd.foo' and `rcmd.bar', where `foo' is a CNAME for `bar', the
resulting principals will be the same. Since the conversion function
can't tell which is correct, these conflicts will have to be resolved
manually.

7.2.1 Conversion example
------------------------

Given the following set of hosts and services:

     foo.se          rcmd
     mail.foo.se     rcmd, pop
     ftp.bar.se      rcmd, ftp

you have a database that consists of the following principals:

`rcmd.foo', `rcmd.mail', `pop.mail', `rcmd.ftp', and `ftp.ftp'.

lets say you also got these extra principals: `rcmd.gone',
`rcmd.old-mail', where `gone.foo.se' was a machine that has now passed
away, and `old-mail.foo.se' was an old mail machine that is now a CNAME
for `mail.foo.se'.

When you convert this database you want the following conversions to be
done:
     rcmd.foo         host/foo.se
     rcmd.mail        host/mail.foo.se
     pop.mail         pop/mail.foo.se
     rcmd.ftp         host/ftp.bar.se
     ftp.ftp          ftp/ftp.bar.se
     rcmd.gone        removed
     rcmd.old-mail    removed

A `krb5.conf' that does this looks like:

     [realms]
             FOO.SE = {
                     v4_name_convert = {
                             host = {
                                     ftp = ftp
                                     pop = pop
                                     rcmd = host
                             }
                     }
                     v4_instance_convert = {
                             foo = foo.se
                             ftp = ftp.bar.se
                     }
                     default_domain = foo.se
             }

The `v4_name_convert' section says which names should be considered
having an instance consisting of a hostname, and it also says how the
names should be converted (for instance `rcmd' should be converted to
`host'). The `v4_instance_convert' section says how a hostname should
be qualified (this is just a hosts-file in disguise). Host-instances
that aren't covered by `v4_instance_convert' are qualified by appending
the contents of the `default_domain'.

Actually, this example doesn't work. Or rather, it works to well. Since
it has no way of knowing which hostnames are valid and which are not, it
will happily convert `rcmd.gone' to `host/gone.foo.se'. This isn't a
big problem, but if you have run your kerberos realm for a few years,
chances are big that you have quite a few `junk' principals.

If you don't want this you can remove the `default_domain' statement,
but then you will have to add entries for _all_ your hosts in the
`v4_instance_convert' section.

Instead of doing this you can use DNS to convert instances. This is not
a solution without problems, but it is probably easier than adding lots
of static host entries.

To enable DNS lookup you should turn on `v4_instance_resolve' in the
`[libdefaults]' section.

7.2.2 Converting a database
---------------------------

The database conversion is done with `hprop'. You can run this command
to propagate the database to the machine called `slave-server' (which
should be running a `hpropd').

     hprop --source=krb4-db --master-key=/.m slave-server

This command can also be to use for converting the v4 database on the
server:

     hprop -n --source=krb4-db -d /var/kerberos/principal --master-key=/.m | hpropd -n

7.3 Version 4 Kadmin
====================

`kadmind' can act as a version 4 kadmind, and you can do most
operations, but with some restrictions (since the version 4 kadmin
protocol is, lets say, very ad hoc.) One example is that it only passes
des keys when creating principals and changing passwords (modern kpasswd
clients do send the password, so it's possible to to password quality
checks). Because of this you can only create principals with des keys,
and you can't set any flags or do any other fancy stuff.

To get this to work, you have to add another entry to inetd (since
version 4 uses port 751, not 749).

_And then there are a many more things you can do; more on this in a
later version of this manual. Until then, UTSL._


File: heimdal.info,  Node: kaserver,  Prev: Converting a version 4 database,  Up: Kerberos 4 issues

7.4 kaserver
============

7.4.1 kaserver emulation
------------------------

The Heimdal kdc can emulate a kaserver. The kaserver is a Kerberos 4
server with pre-authentication using Rx as the on-wire protocol. The kdc
contains a minimalistic Rx implementation.

There are three parts of the kaserver; KAA (Authentication), KAT (Ticket
Granting), and KAM (Maintenance). The KAA interface and KAT interface
both passes over DES encrypted data-blobs (just like the
Kerberos-protocol) and thus do not need any other protection.  The KAM
interface uses `rxkad' (Kerberos authentication layer for Rx) for
security and data protection, and is used for example for changing
passwords.  This part is not implemented in the kdc.

Another difference between the ka-protocol and the Kerberos 4 protocol
is that the pass-phrase is salted with the cellname in the `string to
key' function in the ka-protocol, while in the Kerberos 4 protocol there
is no salting of the password at all. To make sure AFS-compatible keys
are added to each principals when they are created or their password are
changed, `afs3-salt' should be added to `[kadmin]default_keys'.

7.4.2 Transarc AFS Windows client
---------------------------------

The Transarc Windows client uses Kerberos 4 to obtain tokens, and thus
does not need a kaserver. The Windows client assumes that the Kerberos
server is on the same machine as the AFS-database server. If you do not
like to do that you can add a small program that runs on the database
servers that forward all kerberos requests to the real kerberos server.
A program that does this is `krb-forward'
(`ftp://ftp.stacken.kth.se/pub/projekts/krb-forward').


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Windows 2000 compatability,  Next: Programming with Kerberos,  Prev: Kerberos 4 issues,  Up: Top

8 Windows 2000 compatability
****************************

Windows 2000 (formerly known as Windows NT 5) from Microsoft implements
Kerberos 5.  Their implementation, however, has some quirks,
peculiarities, and bugs.  This chapter is a short summary of the things
that we have found out while trying to test Heimdal against Windows
2000.  Another big problem with the Kerberos implementation in Windows
2000 is that the available documentation is more focused on getting
things to work rather than how they work, and not that useful in
figuring out how things really work.

This information should apply to Heimdal 0.8 and Windows 2000
Professional.  It's of course subject to change all the time and mostly
consists of our not so inspired guesses.  Hopefully it's still somewhat
useful.

* Menu:

* Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC::
* Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC::
* Create account mappings::
* Encryption types::
* Authorisation data::
* Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC::
* Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC,  Next: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC,  Prev: Windows 2000 compatability,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.1 Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC
=================================================

You need the command line program called `ksetup.exe' which is available
in the file `SUPPORT/TOOLS/SUPPORT.CAB' on the Windows 2000 Professional
CD-ROM. This program is used to configure the Kerberos settings on a
Workstation.

`Ksetup' store the domain information under the registry key:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\Kerberos\Domains'.

Use the `kadmin' program in Heimdal to create a host principal in the
Kerberos realm.

     unix% kadmin
     kadmin> ank --password=password host/datan.example.com

The name `datan.example.com' should be replaced with DNS name of the
workstation.

You must configure the workstation as a member of a workgroup, as
opposed to a member in an NT domain, and specify the KDC server of the
realm as follows:
     C:> ksetup /setdomain EXAMPLE.COM
     C:> ksetup /addkdc EXAMPLE.COM kdc.example.com

Set the machine password, i.e. create the local keytab:
     C:> ksetup /setmachpassword password

The password used in `ksetup /setmachpassword' must be the same as the
password used in the `kadmin ank' command.

The workstation must now be rebooted.

A mapping between local NT users and Kerberos principals must be
specified.  You have two choices. First:

     C:> ksetup /mapuser user@MY.REALM nt_user

This will map a user to a specific principal; this allows you to have
other usernames in the realm than in your NT user database. (Don't ask
me why on earth you would want that....)

You can also say:
     C:> ksetup /mapuser * *
The Windows machine will now map any user to the corresponding
principal, for example `nisse' to the principal `nisse@MY.REALM'.
(This is most likely what you want.)


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC,  Next: Create account mappings,  Prev: Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.2 Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC
===================================================================

See also the Step-by-Step guide from Microsoft, referenced below.

Install Windows 2000, and create a new controller (Active Directory
Server) for the domain.

By default the trust will be non-transitive. This means that only users
directly from the trusted domain may authenticate. This can be changed
to transitive by using the `netdom.exe' tool. `netdom.exe' can also be
used to add the trust between two realms.

You need to tell Windows 2000 on what hosts to find the KDCs for the
non-Windows realm with `ksetup', see *Note Configuring Windows 2000 to
use a Heimdal KDC::.

This needs to be done on all computers that want enable cross-realm
login with `Mapped Names'.  Then you need to add the inter-realm keys
on the Windows KDC. Start the Domain Tree Management tool (found in
Programs, Administrative tools, Active Directory Domains and Trusts).

Right click on Properties of your domain, select the Trust tab.  Press
Add on the appropriate trust windows and enter domain name and
password. When prompted if this is a non-Windows Kerberos realm, press
OK.

Do not forget to add trusts in both directions (if that's what you
want).

If you want to use `netdom.exe' instead of the Domain Tree Management
tool, you do it like this:

     netdom trust NT.REALM.EXAMPLE.COM /Domain:EXAMPLE.COM /add /realm /passwordt:TrustPassword

You also need to add the inter-realm keys to the Heimdal KDC. There are
some tweaks that you need to do to `krb5.conf' beforehand.

     [libdefaults]
             default_etypes = des-cbc-crc
             default_etypes_des = des-cbc-crc

since otherwise checksum types that are not understood by Windows 2000
will be generated (*note Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC::).

Another issue is salting.  Since Windows 2000 does not seem to
understand Kerberos 4 salted hashes you might need to turn off anything
similar to the following if you have it, at least while adding the
principals that are going to share keys with Windows 2000.

     [kadmin]
             default_keys = v5 v4

So remove v4 from default keys.

What you probably want to use is this:

     [kadmin]
             default_keys = des-cbc-crc:pw-salt arcfour-hmac-md5:pw-salt

Note that before Windows 2003 SP1, arcfour-hmac-md5 wasn't supported
between Windows realms and Non Windows realms.

Once that is also done, you can add the required inter-realm keys:

     kadmin add krbtgt/NT.REALM.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
     kadmin add krbtgt/REALM.EXAMPLE.COM@NT.EXAMPLE.COM

Use the same passwords for both keys.

Do not forget to reboot before trying the new realm-trust (after
running `ksetup'). It looks like it might work, but packets are never
sent to the non-Windows KDC.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Create account mappings,  Next: Encryption types,  Prev: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.3 Create account mappings
===========================

Start the `Active Directory Users and Computers' tool. Select the View
menu, that is in the left corner just below the real menu (or press
Alt-V), and select Advanced Features. Right click on the user that you
are going to do a name mapping for and choose Name mapping.

Click on the Kerberos Names tab and add a new principal from the
non-Windows domain.

This adds `authorizationNames' entry to the users LDAP entry to the
Active Directory LDAP catalog. When you create users by script you can
add this entry instead.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Encryption types,  Next: Authorisation data,  Prev: Create account mappings,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.4 Encryption types
====================

Windows 2000 supports both the standard DES encryptions (`des-cbc-crc'
and `des-cbc-md5') and its own proprietary encryption that is based on
MD4 and RC4 that is documented in and is supposed to be described in
`draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt'.  New users will get both MD4
and DES keys.  Users that are converted from a NT4 database, will only
have MD4 passwords and will need a password change to get a DES key.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Authorisation data,  Next: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC,  Prev: Encryption types,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.5 Authorisation data
======================

The Windows 2000 KDC also adds extra authorisation data in tickets.  It
is at this point unclear what triggers it to do this.  The format of
this data is only available under a "secret" license from Microsoft,
which prohibits you implementing it.

A simple way of getting hold of the data to be able to understand it
better is described here.

  1. Find the client example on using the SSPI in the SDK documentation.

  2. Change "AuthSamp" in the source code to lowercase.

  3. Build the program.

  4. Add the "authsamp" principal with a known password to the
     database.  Make sure it has a DES key.

  5. Run `ktutil add' to add the key for that principal to a keytab.

  6. Run `appl/test/nt_gss_server -p 2000 -s authsamp --dump-auth=FILE'
     where FILE is an appropriate file.

  7. It should authenticate and dump for you the authorisation data in
     the file.

  8. The tool `lib/asn1/asn1_print' is somewhat useful for analysing
     the data.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC,  Next: Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000,  Prev: Authorisation data,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.6 Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC
==============================

There are some issues with salts and Windows 2000.  Using an empty
salt--which is the only one that Kerberos 4 supported, and is therefore
known as a Kerberos 4 compatible salt--does not work, as far as we can
tell from out experiments and users' reports.  Therefore, you have to
make sure you keep around keys with all the different types of salts
that are required.  Microsoft have fixed this issue post Windows 2003.

Microsoft seems also to have forgotten to implement the checksum
algorithms `rsa-md4-des' and `rsa-md5-des'. This can make Name mapping
(*note Create account mappings::) fail if a `des-cbc-md5' key is used.
To make the KDC return only `des-cbc-crc' you must delete the
`des-cbc-md5' key from the kdc using the `kadmin del_enctype' command.

     kadmin del_enctype lha des-cbc-md5

You should also add the following entries to the `krb5.conf' file:

     [libdefaults]
     	default_etypes = des-cbc-crc
     	default_etypes_des = des-cbc-crc

These configuration options will make sure that no checksums of the
unsupported types are generated.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000,  Prev: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC,  Up: Windows 2000 compatability

8.7 Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000
====================================================

See also our paper presented at the 2001 Usenix Annual Technical
Conference, available in the proceedings or at
`http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/usenix01/freenix01/westerlund.html'.

There are lots of texts about Kerberos on Microsoft's web site, here is
a short list of the interesting documents that we have managed to find.

   * Step-by-Step Guide to Kerberos 5 (krb5 1.0) Interoperability:
     `http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/library/planning/security/kerbsteps.asp'.
     Kerberos GSS-API (in Windows-eze SSPI), Windows as a client in a
     non-Windows KDC realm, adding unix clients to a Windows 2000 KDC,
     and adding cross-realm trust (*note Inter-Realm keys (trust)
     between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC::).

   * Windows 2000 Kerberos Authentication:
     `http://www.microsoft.com/TechNet/win2000/win2ksrv/technote/kerberos.asp'.
     White paper that describes how Kerberos is used in Windows 2000.

   * Overview of Kerberos:
     `http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q248/7/58.ASP'.
     Links to useful other links.

   * Event logging for Kerberos:
     `http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q262/1/77.ASP'.
     Basically it say that you can add a registry key
     `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters\LogLevel'
     with value DWORD equal to 1, and then you'll get logging in the
     Event Logger.


Other useful programs include these:

   * pwdump2
     `http://www.bindview.com/Support/RAZOR/Utilities/Windows/pwdump2_readme.cfm'


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Programming with Kerberos,  Next: Migration,  Prev: Windows 2000 compatability,  Up: Top

9 Programming with Kerberos
***************************

First you need to know how the Kerberos model works, go read the
introduction text (*note What is Kerberos?::).

* Menu:

* Kerberos 5 API Overview::
* Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client::
* Validating a password in a server application::
* API differences to MIT Kerberos::
* File formats::


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Kerberos 5 API Overview,  Next: Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client,  Prev: Programming with Kerberos,  Up: Programming with Kerberos

9.1 Kerberos 5 API Overview
===========================

All functions are documented in manual pages.  This section tries to
give an overview of the major components used in Kerberos library, and
point to where to look for a specific function.

9.1.1 Kerberos context
----------------------

A kerberos context (`krb5_context') holds all per thread state. All
global variables that are context specific are stored in this
structure, including default encryption types, credential cache (for
example, a ticket file), and default realms.

See the manual pages for `krb5_context(3)' and `krb5_init_context(3)'.

9.1.2 Kerberos authentication context
-------------------------------------

Kerberos authentication context (`krb5_auth_context') holds all context
related to an authenticated connection, in a similar way to the
kerberos context that holds the context for the thread or process.

The `krb5_auth_context' is used by various functions that are directly
related to authentication between the server/client. Example of data
that this structure contains are various flags, addresses of client and
server, port numbers, keyblocks (and subkeys), sequence numbers, replay
cache, and checksum types.

See the manual page for `krb5_auth_context(3)'.

9.1.3 Kerberos principal
------------------------

The Kerberos principal is the structure that identifies a user or
service in Kerberos. The structure that holds the principal is the
`krb5_principal'. There are function to extract the realm and elements
of the principal, but most applications have no reason to inspect the
content of the structure.

The are several ways to create a principal (with different degree of
portability), and one way to free it.

See manual page for `krb5_principal(3)' for more information about the
functions.

9.1.4 Credential cache
----------------------

A credential cache holds the tickets for a user. A given user can have
several credential caches, one for each realm where the user have the
initial tickets (the first krbtgt).

The credential cache data can be stored internally in different way,
each of them for different proposes.  File credential (FILE) caches and
processes based (KCM) caches are for permanent storage. While memory
caches (MEMORY) are local caches to the local process.

Caches are opened with `krb5_cc_resolve(3)' or created with
`krb5_cc_gen_unique(3)'.

If the cache needs to be opened again (using `krb5_cc_resolve(3)')
`krb5_cc_close(3)' will close the handle, but not the remove the cache.
`krb5_cc_destroy(3)' will zero out the cache, remove the cache so it
can no longer be referenced.

See also manual page for `krb5_ccache(3)'

9.1.5 Kerberos errors
---------------------

Kerberos errors are based on the com_err library.  All error codes are
32-bit signed numbers, the first 24 bits define what subsystem the
error originates from, and last 8 bits are 255 error codes within the
library.  Each error code have fixed string associated with it.  For
example, the error-code -1765328383 have the symbolic name
KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP, and associated error string "Client's entry in
database has expired".

This is a great improvement compared to just getting one of the unix
error-codes back.  However, Heimdal have an extention to pass back
customised errors messages.  Instead of getting "Key table entry not
found", the user might back "failed to find
host/host.example.com@EXAMLE.COM(kvno 3) in keytab /etc/krb5.keytab
(des-cbc-crc)".  This improves the chance that the user find the cause
of the error so you should use the customised error message whenever
its available.

See also manual page for `krb5_get_error_string(3)' and
`krb5_get_err_text(3)'.

9.1.6 Keytab management
-----------------------

A keytab is a storage for locally stored keys. Heimdal includes keytab
support for Kerberos 5 keytabs, Kerberos 4 srvtab, AFS-KeyFile's, and
for storing keys in memory.

Keytabs are used for servers and long-running services.

See also manual page for `krb5_keytab(3)'

9.1.7 Kerberos crypto
---------------------

Heimdal includes a implementation of the Kerberos crypto framework, all
crypto operations.

See also manual page for `krb5_crypto_init(3)', `krb5_keyblock(3)',
`krb5_create_checksum(3)', and `krb5_encrypt(3)'.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client,  Next: Validating a password in a server application,  Prev: Kerberos 5 API Overview,  Up: Programming with Kerberos

9.2 Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client
=============================================

This example contains parts of a sample TCP Kerberos 5 clients, if you
want a real working client, please look in `appl/test' directory in the
Heimdal distribution.

All Kerberos error-codes that are returned from kerberos functions in
this program are passed to `krb5_err', that will print a descriptive
text of the error code and exit. Graphical programs can convert
error-code to a human readable error-string with the
`krb5_get_err_text(3)' function.

Note that you should not use any Kerberos function before
`krb5_init_context()' have completed successfully. That is the reason
`err()' is used when `krb5_init_context()' fails.

First the client needs to call `krb5_init_context' to initialise the
Kerberos 5 library. This is only needed once per thread in the program.
If the function returns a non-zero value it indicates that either the
Kerberos implementation is failing or its disabled on this host.

     #include <krb5.h>

     int
     main(int argc, char **argv)
     {
             krb5_context context;

             if (krb5_context(&context))
                     errx (1, "krb5_context");

Now the client wants to connect to the host at the other end. The
preferred way of doing this is using `getaddrinfo(3)' (for operating
system that have this function implemented), since getaddrinfo is
neutral to the address type and can use any protocol that is available.

             struct addrinfo *ai, *a;
             struct addrinfo hints;
             int error;

             memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
             hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
             hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;

             error = getaddrinfo (hostname, "pop3", &hints, &ai);
             if (error)
                     errx (1, "%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error));

             for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) {
                     int s;

                     s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol);
                     if (s < 0)
                             continue;
                     if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
                             warn ("connect(%s)", hostname);
                                 close (s);
                                 continue;
                     }
                     freeaddrinfo (ai);
                     ai = NULL;
             }
             if (ai) {
                         freeaddrinfo (ai);
                         errx ("failed to contact %s", hostname);
             }

Before authenticating, an authentication context needs to be created.
This context keeps all information for one (to be) authenticated
connection (see `krb5_auth_context(3)').

             status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context);
             if (status)
                     krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init");

For setting the address in the authentication there is a help function
`krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd' that does everything that is needed
when given a connected file descriptor to the socket.

             status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context,
                                                      auth_context,
                                                      &sock);
             if (status)
                     krb5_err (context, 1, status,
                               "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd");

The next step is to build a server principal for the service we want to
connect to. (See also `krb5_sname_to_principal(3)'.)

             status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context,
                                               hostname,
                                               service,
                                               KRB5_NT_SRV_HST,
                                               &server);
             if (status)
                     krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal");

The client principal is not passed to `krb5_sendauth(3)' function, this
causes the `krb5_sendauth' function to try to figure it out itself.

The server program is using the function `krb5_recvauth(3)' to receive
the Kerberos 5 authenticator.

In this case, mutual authentication will be tried. That means that the
server will authenticate to the client. Using mutual authentication is
good since it enables the user to verify that they are talking to the
right server (a server that knows the key).

If you are using a non-blocking socket you will need to do all work of
`krb5_sendauth' yourself. Basically you need to send over the
authenticator from `krb5_mk_req(3)' and, in case of mutual
authentication, verifying the result from the server with
`krb5_rd_rep(3)'.

             status = krb5_sendauth (context,
                                     &auth_context,
                                     &sock,
                                     VERSION,
                                     NULL,
                                     server,
                                     AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
                                     NULL,
                                     NULL,
                                     NULL,
                                     NULL,
                                     NULL,
                                     NULL);
             if (status)
                     krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth");

Once authentication has been performed, it is time to send some data.
First we create a krb5_data structure, then we sign it with
`krb5_mk_safe(3)' using the `auth_context' that contains the
session-key that was exchanged in the
`krb5_sendauth(3)'/`krb5_recvauth(3)' authentication sequence.

             data.data   = "hej";
             data.length = 3;

             krb5_data_zero (&packet);

             status = krb5_mk_safe (context,
                                    auth_context,
                                    &data,
                                    &packet,
                                    NULL);
             if (status)
                     krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe");

And send it over the network.

             len = packet.length;
             net_len = htonl(len);

             if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4)
                     err (1, "krb5_net_write");
             if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len)
                     err (1, "krb5_net_write");

To send encrypted (and signed) data `krb5_mk_priv(3)' should be used
instead. `krb5_mk_priv(3)' works the same way as `krb5_mk_safe(3)',
with the exception that it encrypts the data in addition to signing it.

             data.data   = "hemligt";
             data.length = 7;

             krb5_data_free (&packet);

             status = krb5_mk_priv (context,
                                    auth_context,
                                    &data,
                                    &packet,
                                    NULL);
             if (status)
                     krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv");

And send it over the network.

             len = packet.length;
             net_len = htonl(len);

             if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4)
                     err (1, "krb5_net_write");
             if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len)
                     err (1, "krb5_net_write");

The server is using `krb5_rd_safe(3)' and `krb5_rd_priv(3)' to verify
the signature and decrypt the packet.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: Validating a password in a server application,  Next: API differences to MIT Kerberos,  Prev: Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client,  Up: Programming with Kerberos

9.3 Validating a password in an application
===========================================

See the manual page for `krb5_verify_user(3)'.


File: heimdal.info,  Node: API differences to MIT Kerberos,  Next: File formats,  Prev: Validating a password in a server application,  Up: Programming with Kerberos

9.4 API differences to MIT Kerberos
===================================

This section is somewhat disorganised, but so far there is no overall
structure to the differences, though some of the have their root in
that Heimdal uses an ASN.1 compiler and MIT doesn't.

9.4.1 Principal and realms
--------------------------

Heimdal stores the realm as a `krb5_realm', that is a `char *'.  MIT
Kerberos uses a `krb5_data' to store a realm.

In Heimdal `krb5_principal' doesn't contain the component `name_type';
it's instead stored in component `name.name_type'. To get and set the
nametype in Heimdal, use `krb5_principal_get_type(3)' and
`krb5_principal_set_type(3)'.

For more information about principal and realms, see
`krb5_principal(3)'.

9.4.2 Error messages
--------------------

To get the error string, Heimdal uses `krb5_get_error_string(3)' or, if
`NULL' is returned, `krb5_get_err_text(3)'. This is to return custom
error messages (like "Can't find host/datan.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM in
/etc/krb5.conf." instead of a "Key table entry not found" that
`error_message(3)' returns.

Heimdal uses a threadsafe(r) version of the com_err interface; the
global `com_err' table isn't initialised.  Then `error_message(3)'
returns quite a boring error string (just the error code itself).


File: heimdal.info,  Node: File formats,  Prev: API differences to MIT Kerberos,  Up: Programming with Kerberos

9.5 File formats
================

This section documents the diffrent file formats that are used in
Heimdal and other Kerberos implementations.

9.5.1 keytab
------------

The keytab binary format is not a standard format. The format has
evolved and may continue to. It is however understood by several
Kerberos implementations including Heimdal, MIT, Sun's Java ktab and
are created by the ktpass.exe utility from Windows. So it has
established itself as the defacto format for storing Kerberos keys.

The following C-like structure definitions illustrate the MIT keytab
file format. All values are in network byte order. All text is ASCII.

       keytab {
           uint16_t file_format_version;                    /* 0x502 */
           keytab_entry entries[*];
       };

       keytab_entry {
           int32_t size;
           uint16_t num_components;   /* subtract 1 if version 0x501 */
           counted_octet_string realm;
           counted_octet_string components[num_components];
           uint32_t name_type;       /* not present if version 0x501 */
           uint32_t timestamp;
           uint8_t vno8;
           keyblock key;
           uint32_t vno; /* only present if >= 4 bytes left in entry */
       };

       counted_octet_string {
           uint16_t length;
           uint8_t data[length];
       };

       keyblock {
           uint16_t type;
           counted_octet_string;
       };

All numbers are stored in network byteorder (big endian) format.

The keytab file format begins with the 16 bit file_format_version which
at the time this document was authored is 0x502. The format of older
keytabs is described at the end of this document.

The file_format_version is immediately followed by an array of
keytab_entry structures which are prefixed with a 32 bit size indicating
the number of bytes that follow in the entry. Note that the size should
be evaluated as signed. This is because a negative value indicates that
the entry is in fact empty (e.g. it has been deleted) and that the
negative value of that negative value (which is of course a positive
value) is the offset to the next keytab_entry. Based on these size
values alone the entire keytab file can be traversed.

The size is followed by a 16 bit num_components field indicating the
number of counted_octet_string components in the components array.

The num_components field is followed by a counted_octet_string
representing the realm of the principal.

A counted_octet_string is simply an array of bytes prefixed with a 16
bit length. For the realm and name components, the counted_octet_string
bytes are ASCII encoded text with no zero terminator.

Following the realm is the components array that represents the name of
the principal. The text of these components may be joined with slashs
to construct the typical SPN representation. For example, the service
principal HTTP/www.foo.net@FOO.NET would consist of name components
"HTTP" followed by "www.foo.net".

Following the components array is the 32 bit name_type (e.g. 1 is
KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL, 2 is KRB5_NT_SRV_INST, 5 is KRB5_NT_UID, etc). In
practice the name_type is almost certainly 1 meaning KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL.

The 32 bit timestamp indicates the time the key was established for that
principal. The value represents the number of seconds since Jan 1, 1970.

The 8 bit vno8 field is the version number of the key. This value is
overridden by the 32 bit vno field if it is present. The vno8 field is
filled with the lower 8 bits of the 32 bit protocol kvno field.

The keyblock structure consists of a 16 bit value indicating the
encryption type and is a counted_octet_string containing the key.  The
encryption type is the same as the Kerberos standard (e.g. 3 is
des-cbc-md5, 23 is arcfour-hmac-md5, etc).

The last field of the keytab_entry structure is optional. If the size of
the keytab_entry indicates that there are at least 4 bytes remaining, a
32 bit value representing the key version number is present. This value
supersedes the 8 bit vno8 value preceeding the keyblock.

Older keytabs with a file_format_version of 0x501 are different in
three ways:

All integers are in host byte order [1].

The num_components field is 1 too large (i.e. after decoding, decrement by 1).

The 32 bit name_type field is not present.

[1] The file_format_version field should really be treated as two
separate 8 bit quantities representing the major and minor version
number respectively.

9.5.2 Heimdal database dump file
--------------------------------

Format of the Heimdal text dump file as of Heimdal 0.6.3:

Each line in the dump file is one entry in the database.

Each field of a line is separated by one or more spaces, with the
exception of fields consisting of principals containing spaces, where
space can be quoted with \ and \ is quoted by \.

Fields and their types are:

     	Quoted princial (quote character is \) [string]
     	Keys [keys]
     	Created by [event]
     	Modified by [event optional]
     	Valid start time [time optional]
     	Valid end time [time optional]
     	Password end valid time [time optional]
     	Max lifetime of ticket [time optional]
     	Max renew time of ticket [integer optional]
     	Flags [hdb flags]
     	Generation number [generation optional]
     	Extensions [extentions optional]

Fields following these silently are ignored.

All optional fields will be skipped if they fail to parse (or comprise
the optional field marker of "-", w/o quotes).

Example:

     fred@EXAMPLE.COM 27:1:16:e8b4c8fc7e60b9e641dcf4cff3f08a701d982a2f89ba373733d26ca59ba6c789666f6b8bfcf169412bb1e5dceb9b33cda29f3412:-:1:3:4498a933881178c744f4232172dcd774c64e81fa6d05ecdf643a7e390624a0ebf3c7407a:-:1:2:b01934b13eb795d76f3a80717d469639b4da0cfb644161340ef44fdeb375e54d684dbb85:-:1:1:ea8e16d8078bf60c781da90f508d4deccba70595258b9d31888d33987cd31af0c9cced2e:- 20020415130120:admin@EXAMPLE.COM 20041221112428:fred@EXAMPLE.COM - - - 86400 604800 126 20020415130120:793707:28 -

Encoding of types are as follows:

keys
          kvno:[masterkvno:keytype:keydata:salt]{zero or more separated by :}

     kvno is the key version number.

     keydata is hex-encoded

     masterkvno is the kvno of the database master key.  If this field
     is empty, the kadmin load and merge operations will encrypt the
     key data with the master key if there is one.  Otherwise the key
     data will be imported asis.

     salt is encoded as "-" (no/default salt) or

          salt-type /
          salt-type / "string"
          salt-type / hex-encoded-data

     keytype is the protocol enctype number; see enum ENCTYPE in
     include/krb5_asn1.h for values.

     Example:
          27:1:16:e8b4c8fc7e60b9e641dcf4cff3f08a701d982a2f89ba373733d26ca59ba6c789666f6b8bfcf169412bb1e5dceb9b33cda29f3412:-:1:3:4498a933881178c744f4232172dcd774c64e81fa6d05ecdf643a7e390624a0ebf3c7407a:-:1:2:b01934b13eb795d76f3a80717d469639b4da0cfb644161340ef44fdeb375e54d684dbb85:-:1:1:ea8e16d8078bf60c781da90f508d4deccba70595258b9d31888d33987cd31af0c9cced2e:-

          kvno=27,{key: masterkvno=1,keytype=des3-cbc-sha1,keydata=..., default salt}...

time
     Format of the time is: YYYYmmddHHMMSS, corresponding to strftime
     format "%Y%m%d%k%M%S".

     Time is expressed in UTC.

     Time can be optional (using -), when the time 0 is used.

     Example:

          20041221112428

event
          	time:principal

     time is as given in format time

     principal is a string.  Not quoting it may not work in earlier
     versions of Heimdal.

     Example:
          20041221112428:bloggs@EXAMPLE.COM

hdb flags
     Integer encoding of HDB flags, see HDBFlags in lib/hdb/hdb.asn1.
     Each bit in the integer is the same as the bit in the
     specification.

generation:
          time:usec:gen

     usec is a the microsecond, integer.  gen is generation number,
     integer.

     The generation can be defaulted (using '-') or the empty string

extensions:
          first-hex-encoded-HDB-Extension[:second-...]

     HDB-extension is encoded the DER encoded HDB-Extension from
     lib/hdb/hdb.asn1. Consumers HDB extensions should be aware that
     unknown entires needs to be preserved even thought the ASN.1 data
     content might be unknown. There is a critical flag in the data to
     show to the KDC that the entry MUST be understod if the entry is
     to be used.



File: heimdal.info,  Node: Migration,  Next: Acknowledgments,  Prev: Programming with Kerberos,  Up: Top

10 Migration
************

10.1 General issues
===================

When migrating from a Kerberos 4 KDC.

10.2 Order in what to do things:
================================

   * Convert the database, check all principals that hprop complains
     about.

     `hprop -n --source=<NNN>| hpropd -n'

     Replace <NNN> with whatever source you have, like krb4-db or
     krb4-dump.

   * Run a Kerberos 5 slave for a while.

   * Figure out if it does everything you want it to.

     Make sure that all things that you use works for you.

   * Let a small number of controlled users use Kerberos 5 tools.

     Find a sample population of your users and check what programs
     they use, you can also check the kdc-log to check what ticket are
     checked out.

   * Burn the bridge and change the master.

   * Let all users use the Kerberos 5 tools by default.

   * Turn off services that do not need Kerberos 4 authentication.

     Things that might be hard to get away is old programs with support
     for Kerberos 4. Example applications are old Eudora installations
     using KPOP, and Zephyr. Eudora can use the Kerberos 4 kerberos in
     the Heimdal kdc.



File: heimdal.info,  Node: Acknowledgments,  Prev: Migration,  Up: Top

Appendix A Acknowledgments
**************************

Eric Young wrote "libdes". Heimdal used to use libdes, without it
kth-krb would never have existed. Since there are no longer any Eric
Young code left in the library, we renamed it to libhcrypto.

All functions in libhcrypto have been re-implemented or used available
public domain code. The core AES function where written by Vincent
Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers and Paulo Barreto.  The core DES SBOX
transformation was written by Richard Outerbridge. `imath' that is used
for public key crypto support is written by Michael J. Fromberger.

The University of California at Berkeley initially wrote `telnet', and
`telnetd'.  The authentication and encryption code of `telnet' and
`telnetd' was added by David Borman (then of Cray Research, Inc).  The
encryption code was removed when this was exported and then added back
by Juha Eskelinen.

The `popper' was also a Berkeley program initially.

Some of the functions in `libroken' also come from Berkeley by way of
NetBSD/FreeBSD.

`editline' was written by Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. Heimdal
contains a modifed copy.

The `getifaddrs' implementation for Linux was written by Hideaki
YOSHIFUJI for the Usagi project.

Bugfixes, documentation, encouragement, and code has been contributed
by:
Derrick J Brashear

Ken Hornstein

Johan Ihrén

Magnus Ahltorp

Mark Eichin

Marc Horowitz

Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH

Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino

Daniel Kouril

Åke Sandgren

Michal Vocu

Miroslav Ruda

Brian A May

Chaskiel M Grundman

Richard Nyberg

Frank van der Linden

Cizzi Storm

Petr Holub

Mario Strasser

David Love

Björn Sandell

Michael B Allen

Douglas E Engert

Jason McIntyre

and we hope that those not mentioned here will forgive us.

All bugs were introduced by ourselves.



Tag Table:
Node: Top211
Node: Introduction1870
Node: What is Kerberos?4682
Node: Building and Installing9795
Node: Setting up a realm13430
Node: Configuration file14331
Node: Creating the database17114
Node: Modifying the database20038
Node: Checking the setup21631
Node: keytabs22483
Node: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver23351
Node: Remote administration24927
Node: Password changing26857
Node: Testing clients and servers30555
Node: Slave Servers30883
Node: Incremental propagation32638
Node: Salting35406
Node: Cross realm37256
Node: Transit policy39780
Node: Setting up DNS41452
Node: Using LDAP to store the database43927
Node: Providing Kerberos credentials to servers and programs49707
Node: Setting up PK-INIT51802
Node: Applications61470
Node: Authentication modules61670
Node: Digital SIA62264
Node: IRIX66648
Node: AFS67938
Node: Things in search for a better place70582
Node: Kerberos 4 issues73311
Node: Principal conversion issues73773
Ref: Principal conversion issues-Footnote-176004
Ref: Principal conversion issues-Footnote-276072
Node: Converting a version 4 database76125
Node: kaserver81193
Node: Windows 2000 compatability82964
Node: Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC84164
Node: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC86150
Node: Create account mappings89178
Node: Encryption types89940
Node: Authorisation data90545
Node: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC91697
Node: Useful links when reading about the Windows 200093001
Node: Programming with Kerberos94815
Node: Kerberos 5 API Overview95291
Node: Walkthrough of a sample Kerberos 5 client99717
Node: Validating a password in a server application107505
Node: API differences to MIT Kerberos107840
Node: File formats109298
Node: Migration117780
Node: Acknowledgments119060

End Tag Table
